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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2
¶3

¶4

¶5

The patent world is quietly undergoing a change of seismic proportions. In a few short years, a
handful of entities have amassed vast treasuries of patents on an unprecedented scale. To give some
sense of the magnitude of this change, our research shows that in a little more than five years, the
most massive of these has accumulated 30,000-60,000 patents worldwide, which would make it the
5th largest patent portfolio of any domestic US company and the 15th largest of any company in the
world.
Although size is important in understanding the nature of the shift, size alone is not the issue. It
is also the method of organization and the types of activities that are causing a paradigm shift in the
world of patents and innovation.
These entities, which we call mass aggregators, do not engage in the manufacturing of products
nor do they conduct much research. Rather, they pursue other goals of interest to their founders and
investors. Non-practicing entities have been around the patent world for some time, and in the past,
they have fallen into two broad categories.1 The first category includes universities and research
laboratories, which tend to have scholars engaged in basic research and license out inventions rather
than manufacturing products on their own. The second category includes individuals or small groups
who purchase patents to assert them against existing, successful products. Those in the second
category have been described colloquially as “trolls,” which appears to be a reference to the
children’s tale of the three billy goats who must pay a toll to the troll waiting under the bridge if they
wish to pass. Troll activity is generally reviled by operating companies as falling somewhere between
extortion and a drag on innovation.2 In particular, many believe that patent trolls often extract a
disproportionate return, far beyond the value that their patented invention adds to the commercial
product, if it adds at all.3
The new mass aggregator, however, is an entirely different beast. To begin with, funding sources
for mass aggregators include some very successful and respectable organizations, including
manufacturing companies such as Apple, eBay, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, and Sony, as well as
academic institutions such as the University of Pennsylvania and Notre Dame, and other entities
such as the World Bank and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Nations such as China,
France, South Korea, and Taiwan even have their own mass aggregators to varying degrees.
Moreover, the acquisition appetites and patent supply sources are quite interesting. Mass
aggregators may have portfolios that range across vastly different areas of innovation from
computers to telecommunications to biomedicine to nanotechnology.4 In some of the acquisition
1 Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115
(“NPEs are firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing fees.”); U.S. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 2011 WL
838912 at 60 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (“NPE also commonly refers to firms
that obtain nearly all of their patents through acquisition or purchase in order to assert them against manufacturers.”); see also
Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1571, 1572 (2009).
2 Chien, supra note 1 at 1577-78 (“The term NPE generally refers to a patentee that does not make products or ‘practice’ its
inventions.”); Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v.
Mercexchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331, 333 (2006) (distinguishing between universities and
patent trolls); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629-30 (2008)
(distinguishing between universities as non-practicing entities and trolls); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent
Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (“‘[P]atent troll’ . . . is a derogatory term for firms that
use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture technology.”); see also Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2193 (2009) (cautioning universities against appearing troll-like because patent trolls are perceived
unsympathetically).
3 See Lemley, supra note 2, at 613-14; Magliocca, supra note 2 at 1810 (“Critics claim that these firms are little more than
blackmailers who put a crippling tax on productive enterprises.”).
4 Pharmaceuticals seems to be the one technical area generally excluded from mass aggregation, perhaps because the
pharmaceutical innovation system has evolved to include lesser degrees of technical sharing.

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us

¶6

¶7

¶8

¶9

¶10

2

activity, mass aggregators purchase large chunks, and even the majority, of an operating company’s
patents and patent applications. They typically pay cash up front, as well as a share of any future
profits generated from asserting the patents against anyone other than the selling manufacturer. Mass
aggregators have engaged in other unusual acquisition approaches as well, including purportedly
purchasing the rights to all future inventions by researchers at universities in developing countries.
Other acquisition approaches purportedly include targeted purchases of patents that are of particular
interest to the mass aggregators’ investors.
The types of returns promised to investors and the types of benefits offered to participants are
also quite different from garden-variety non-practicing entities, as are some of the tactics used in
organizing the entities and in asserting the patents. Finally, the scale itself is simply mind-boggling.
Mass aggregators operate on a scale and at a level of sophistication and complexity that would have
been unimaginable a decade ago. They have taken the prototype strategies pioneered by a prior
generation of non-practicing entities and changed them into some of the cleverest strategies yet seen
in the intellectual property rights field.
The goal of this article is to shed some light on mass aggregators. We hope to provide some
understanding of the nature of the change, to analyze its economics and implications, and to offer
some normative considerations. In the descriptive section, we focus on the oldest and largest of the
mass aggregators, Intellectual Ventures, which has gone to great lengths to maintain secrecy.
Working from public sources and investing thousands of hours of research, we offer a detailed
picture of the entity, tracing through approximately 1300 shell companies and thousands of patents.
The section also describes in brief form several other mass aggregators, including ones that are public
companies.
In the analytic section, we examine the potential implications of mass aggregators for the patent
system specifically, for innovation in general, and for the economy as a whole. We look at the
potential positive effects that mass aggregators might bring, including facilitating appropriate rewards
for forgotten inventors, creating a market to connect innovators with those who can manufacture
their inventions, and, most important, operating as a form of insurance—something akin to an AntiTroll defense fund.
On the other side, we look at the potential economic dangers of mass aggregators and the
market for patent monetization they create. Given the imperfections of the patent system and the
odd characteristics of the product created by the market for patent monetization, mass aggregators
may serve as a tax on current production that reduces future innovation. Characteristics of the
market may also provide opportunities for anticompetitive behavior.
Finally, we offer a few preliminary, normative observations on whether and to what extent the
sovereign, in the form of various governmental bodies, should become involved in these market-level
changes. The section also considers broadly the types of changes that would have to occur for such
participation to take place in a meaningful and minimally disruptive fashion.
I. FACTS

¶11

Over the last five years, information about mass aggregators has slowly filtered out into the
patent community. Initial information was fueled largely by speculation as well as quiet, oblique
comments from those bound by confidentiality agreements or concerned about incurring the wrath
of the aggregators. As a reporter researching one of the mass aggregators noted as recently as July
2011,
[W]e called people who had licensing arrangements with [Intellectual Ventures], we called
people who were defendants in lawsuits involving [Intellectual Ventures] patents, we called
every single company being sued by Oasis Research. No one would talk to us.5
5 Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, This American Life: When Patents Attack (National Public Radio broadcast, July 22, 2011)
(transcript available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/25/138576167/when-patents-attack) (noting that the
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We encountered similar reticence when we first began trying to understand the structure and
activities of aggregators. “You can’t find out anything about them; don’t even try,” is a chant that has
been whispered in intellectual property circles for a number of years. It motivated us to take a hard
look, and the information eventually unraveled like the yarn from an old sweater.
A literature search on Intellectual Ventures reveals many opinions about the company but few
independent facts. We have aimed to fill that void by tracing the intellectual property assets that the
company appears to own, identifying the sources of those assets, and describing the company’s
activities. The data we provide here is the result of four years of painstaking research, piecing
together bits of information available from public sources.
A. Intellectual Ventures

¶14

¶15

¶16
¶17

¶18

Much about Intellectual Ventures is shrouded in secrecy. Intellectual Ventures has acknowledged
that it intentionally withholds the true scope and nature of its IP portfolio.6 Its licensing transactions
and interactions are protected by strict nondisclosure agreements, and the structure of its business
activities makes it difficult to get a handle on the full extent of its activities. For example, our
research has identified more than a thousand shell companies that Intellectual Ventures has used to
conduct its intellectual property acquisitions, and it has taken considerable effort to identify these.
The range and scope of its activities are so vast that it is difficult to conceptualize the reach of
Intellectual Ventures.
Intellectual Ventures was founded in 2000 by Nathan Myhrvold and Edward Jung, both of
whom formerly served in high-level positions at Microsoft.7 Peter Detkin also played a key
management role in developing Intellectual Ventures.8 In one of patent law’s great ironies, Detkin
coined the derogatory term “patent troll” during his tenure as the chief intellectual property officer at
Intel.9
Although operations began in 2000, Intellectual Ventures does not appear to have begun its
massive patent acquisitions in earnest until somewhere around 2004 or 2005, when the annual
number of acquisitions transaction we could identify rose from a handful to several hundred.
According to Intellectual Ventures, invention per se is its product, and both Myhrvold and Detkin
have referred to the company’s business model as “Invention Capitalism.” They define Invention
Capitalism as applying concepts from venture capital and private equity to develop and commercially
exploit new inventions.10
Although Intellectual Ventures is designed to make money from trading in patent rights, the
founders describe their activities as ones that will incentivize research and development in all
technical subjects. Myhrvold, for example, has been quoted as saying the following:
Most of people think of research as a charity, a philanthropic thing. They don’t view it as a
for-profit venture. So our goal is to make research something you can invest in. I think it’s
reluctance was fueled in part by fear and in part by Intellectual Ventures’ nondisclosure agreement, rumored to be the strictest in
Silicon Valley).
6 See Victoria Slind-Flor, The Goodfellas: Detkin and Myhrvold on Patents, Trolls & Intellectual Ventures, 19 INTELL. ASSET MGMT.
28, 34 (noting that Intellectual Ventures will not reveal how many patents it has or the entities to which it has licensed technology,
and quoting Myhrvold’s response that “We’re a private company. We don’t disclose our investment plans any more than Warren
Buffet does.”); see also Steve Lohr, Turning Patents into ‘Invention Capital’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at B1 (paraphrasing Myhrvold as
saying that Intellectual Venture’s “penchant for secrecy” is a legacy from its startup days when it “did not want to tip its hand”).
7 Intellectual Ventures LLC was formed on September 21, 1999. Corporations Division – Registration Data Search, WASH.
SEC. OF STATE, http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/search_detail.aspx?ubi=601981783 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). Nathan Myhrvold
formerly served as Microsoft’s chief technology officer, and Jung served as Microsoft’s chief architect. Our Team, INTELLECTUAL
VENTURES, http://intellectualventures.com/WhoWeAre/OurTeam.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
8 Detkin joined Intellectual Ventures in 2002. Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 636 n.* (2007), available at http://www.jmripl.com/Publications/Vol6/Issue4/Detkin.pdf.
9 Id. at 636 (stating that he coined the term); Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE RECORDER
(July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf (using the term and attributing it to Detkin).
10 See Detkin, supra note 8, at 636 n.*; Lohr, supra note 6 (citing Nathan Myhrvold); Nathan Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding
Eureka, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, Mar. 2010, at 40, available at http://hbr.org/2010/03/the-big-idea-funding-eureka/ar/1.
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a valuable investment if you know what you’re doing. So we think that if we supply capital
and expertise in the right way then we can make a hell of an investment and if we are
successful at doing it, the net research budget will go up.11
¶19

¶20

¶21

¶22

¶23

The scope of Intellectual Ventures’ activities is so vast that it is difficult to contemplate the reach
of the company. It has invested in innovations and technologies across a broad spectrum of
industries—everything from computer hardware to biomedicine to consumer electronics to
nanotechnology. In more than 1,000 transactions, by our count, the company has acquired
inventions and related intellectual property from individual inventors, corporations of all sizes,
governments, research laboratories, and universities.
Getting a handle on the scope and activities of an entity as secretive as Intellectual Ventures is
not easy.12 We have tried to create a picture of the company by piecing together information from
publicly available sources. These sources include the patent assignment records of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); the USPTO’s PAIR database,13 which includes the file
histories of patents; the USPTO’s patent and application database; government records for key
states, including Delaware, Nevada, Washington, and California; Internal Revenue Service filings for
non-profit entities; Securities and Exchange Commission data from 10Q and 10K filings by
corporations; the Federal Register; filings made in dozens of litigations; and press releases and other
publications from various entities.
The structure of the Intellectual Ventures network of operations makes it tremendously difficult
to detect and trace the company’s activities. For example, Intellectual Ventures has acknowledged
that it uses shell companies for purchasing and holding patents, although it has not publicly identified
the number of shells or their names.14 In 2006, one magazine identified 50 shell companies that it
believed were being operated by Intellectual Ventures. Our research has pieced together 1276 shell
companies associated with Intellectual Ventures. We do not believe that we have identified all of the
Intellectual Ventures shell companies, but these 1276 companies alone hold roughly 8000 US patents
and 3000 pending US patent applications as of May 2011.15
Even with some knowledge of the shell companies, tracking the Intellectual Ventures portfolio is
complicated by the fact that Intellectual Ventures has at times neglected to record its ownership for
long periods of time. In some cases, for example, we found parties indicating that they had sold or
licensed patents to Intellectual Ventures—even to the point of identifying the intellectual property
with great particularity—but we could not locate a corresponding assignment in the USPTO
database.16
Although Intellectual Ventures has never divulged the precise nature and extent of its portfolio,
the company has reported that it holds some 35,000 “invention assets.”17 The company does not
define the term, but we assume that this phrase refers not only to patents but also to patent
applications, non-filed invention disclosures,18 design patents, trademarks, and any trade secrets
Nathan Myhrvold, Speech at the Churchill Club in Palo Alto, CA (Feb. 27, 2007).
Credit for this exhaustive research goes to co-author Tom Ewing.
13 PAIR stands for Patent Application Information Retrieval.
14 See Slind-Flor, supra note 6, at 32 (quoting Peter Detkin as acknowledging that Intellectual Ventures uses shells for
acquisitions and noting that many companies do this to keep potential liabilities of the acquired company from affecting the whole
organization).
15 At least 175 of the patents acquired by Intellectual Ventures have reached the end of their terms and expired. Likewise,
many more of their patents will expire in just a few years. We have not checked patent maintenance fee payment information to
determine if any of the other patents have expired due to failure to pay maintenance fees. In any event, the “active” US portfolio is
likely a bit smaller than suggested by the numbers above.
16 In one case, Intellectual Ventures opted not to record a change of ownership for 2506 days following execution. An
assignment for US Publication No. 20090254972 was executed on Aug. 9, 2002, but not recorded until June 19, 2009. See , USPTO
ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Publication Number” for
“20090254972”).
17 Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, BlueCat Networks Signs Patent Agreement With Intellectual Ventures (June 28, 2011),
available at http://intellectualventures.com/newsroom/pressreleases/11-0628/BlueCat_Networks_Signs_Patent_Agreement_With_Intellectual_Ventures.aspx.
18 The company has claimed to have some 3000 unfiled invention disclosures. See Tom Ewing, Inside the World of Public
11
12
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owned or licensed by the company. Further confusing the issue is whether the company counts as
“invention assets” patents or only patent families. The company also is not clear about where these
assets exist, but we assume that this number represents the company’s worldwide portfolio. If the
35,000 number were to represent the company’s United States portfolio alone, Intellectual Ventures
would hold a portfolio larger than IBM’s United States portfolio, which is generally acknowledged as
the largest domestic portfolio.
To give a fuller picture of precisely what Intellectual Ventures owns, we assembled as much
information as possible from public sources on the company’s holdings that are actually patents. To
summarize the information below, we estimate that Intellectual Ventures has a worldwide portfolio
of 30,000-60,000 patents and applications as of May 2011. This would mean that in just a few short
years, Intellectual Ventures has acquired at least the 5th largest patent portfolio among US companies
and approximately the 15th largest patent portfolio worldwide.19
B. Patents and Applications Held by Intellectual Ventures

¶25

¶26

¶27

With a great deal of digging, we were able to locate 1276 shell companies and related entities that
appear to be associated with Intellectual Ventures.20 These companies hold approximately 8000 US
patents and 3000 pending US patent applications. We do not believe that we have found all of the
shell companies.21 Nevertheless, we believe we can calculate a reasonable approximation of
Intellectual Ventures’ patent holdings. The overall size of Intellectual Venture’s portfolio can be
estimated in several ways based on the information that we have obtained. The estimate below comes
from what we have learned about these 1276 shell companies.22
We begin by using information about Intellectual Venture’s shell companies. First, we have
identified some 50 shells that appear to serve a management function, one shell that serves a
trademark function, a dozen or so that serve investment functions. Of the remaining 1200
companies, 954 companies have patents recorded against their names, and some 242 shells do not
have patents recorded against their names, although some of them clearly hold licensed-in patent
rights.
We have noticed that Intellectual Ventures has a pattern of establishing a shell to receive assets
well before the transaction related to those assets has been completed. Thus, we suspect that at least
some of the 242 companies without patents recorded against their names are awaiting allocation of
assets from a patent-related transaction. We suspect that others have already experienced a patentrelated transaction, but that the transaction has yet to surface in the public record. For example, if
Intellectual Ventures receives an exclusive license to a patent, the effect would be similar to owning
the patent outright, but the parties would not necessarily record a change of patent ownership with

Auctions, 42 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 67 (2010).
19 Patent holdings are difficult to compare and rank because, among other things, to be completely accurate, one must
account for patents expired on the basis of age and/or failure to pay annuity/maintenance fees.
20 The shell companies that we know about seem to serve the following functions: 1201 patent holding shells, 1 trademark
holding shell, 51 asset management shells, and 24 executive and investment shells. See Appendix C for a further discussion of
research methodology.
21 As noted elsewhere, we have found approximately 100 other companies registered in Delaware that appear to be shell
companies but do not presently hold patents. We will continue to monitor these companies.
22 The size of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio can also be estimated based upon how much the company has spent acquiring
this portfolio and how much they have spent per patent. As an arbitrage buyer, one could assume that Intellectual Ventures spends
roughly the same amount per patent in all of its purchases. Myhrvold reported that Intellectual Ventures had spent $1.163 billion
acquiring patents by May, 2009. Nigel Page, IV Shifts Gear, 36 INTELL. ASSET MAG. 9, 10 (2009). In a study of Ocean Tomo patent
auctions, we concluded that Intellectual Ventures had spent a little more than $61 million acquiring 410 US patents and their
foreign counterparts at an average cost of $148,966 per US patent obtained. Tom Ewing, Publicly Auctioned Patent Buyers, 34
AVANCEPT (2010). Some published reports have said that Intellectual Ventures pays only $40,000 per patent. Page, supra at 13.
Application of this information combined with additional information about the growth of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio since
May, 2009 leads to an estimated US portfolio of 10,149 US patents and 27,649 foreign patents by May, 2011 along with several
thousand pending applications worldwide. This second estimate fits well with the estimate based upon analysis of patent-holding
shell companies.
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the USPTO, especially if the recipient of the exclusive license believed it highly unlikely that the
registered patent owner would resell the patent to someone else.
The 954 shell companies that have patents recorded against their names have an average of 8.5
patents and 3.2 patent applications per company. Assuming that the other 242 shell companies
contain unrecorded transactions, and applying these averages would yield another 2057 patents and
774 applications. Adding these missing patents and applications to our totals would yield roughly
10,000 patents and 3700 applications.23
Intellectual Ventures also claims that it files roughly 500 applications per year and that it is now
one of the top 50 US patent filers. The company is somewhat vague as to whether these 500
applications comprise just those from its invention sessions or whether further filings24 from
purchased portfolios are included in this total. In any event, given that patent applications publish 18
months after filing, there should be roughly 750 presently unpublished patent applications as of May
2011.25 Including unpublished applications keeps our estimate of US patents at 10,000 but the
number of applications rises to roughly 4400.
The actual portfolio may be substantially smaller or larger than this estimate suggests. For
example, if Intellectual Ventures has been more prompt about recording assignments than appears to
be the case, then the portfolio may be smaller. Conversely, if Intellectual Ventures has significantly
more shell companies than we have found, then the portfolio may be substantially larger than our
estimate.
Despite having uncovered more than 1200 shell companies, we have little doubt that other shell
companies have been formed. Exclusive licenses granted to Intellectual Ventures represent the
greatest source of unknown patents since these agreements may not necessarily be recorded against
the patents to which they pertain. For example, we are aware of transactions involving the University
of Rhode Island and Campinas State University in Brazil, but we have no idea what shell company
was involved. The University of California, San Diego has reported agreements with five shell
companies but the patents involved in the licensing arrangement have not been recorded.26 Similarly,
the US Navy publicly disclosed the licensing of patents to two shell companies, but these licenses
have not been recorded.27
In terms of the non-US portion of the portfolio, we note that approximately half of Intellectual
Ventures’ US portfolio originated with non-US entities. Many of these came from European entities,
where intellectual property seems to be particularly undervalued in relation to United States
intellectual property.28 This suggests that Intellectual Ventures may be acting as an arbitrageur to
exploit the disparities in intellectual property valuation between the United States and the rest of the
world. Finally, in contemplating the size of the company’s foreign patents, we note that a sizeable
portion of the company’s portfolio is fairly young, and as a general matter, younger portfolios are
prosecuted more vigorously in international jurisdictions than has historically been the case for older
portfolios.29
These factors strongly suggest that a typical US patent in the Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio has
at least one foreign counterpart. Given that the world has more than 150 patent-granting countries,
the global scope of any patent portfolio can jump tremendously when the foreign counterparts are

This estimate does include certain recently acquired portfolios or apparently allied ones.
E.g., continuation applications and reissue applications.
25 The earliest that an application filed in December 2010 would publish is June 2011, and only if the application had a
foreign counterpart. Otherwise, the application will typically remain secret until it issues as a patent.
26 These companies are Eilean Technologies, Jacksonville Timucuan, Discovery Advance, Bettles Gates, and 10Spot.
27 These companies are Bixenta Ventures and NanoComm Systems.
28 Gaetan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property Assets: Evidence from Survey Data 2, 3-4, 8, 18 (Melbourne
Inst. of Applied Econ. and Soc. Research, Working Paper No. 20/10, 2010), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g3g2641632872gp3/.
29 See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD PATENT REPORT, A STATISTICAL REVIEW 7 (2008), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_pub_931.pdf.
23
24

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us

¶34

¶35

7

considered.30 Not all patents have a foreign counterpart, however, and most patents do not have
foreign counterparts in more than a handful of countries.
We did not search foreign corporate records, but it is possible that one could find more
Intellectual Ventures patents that way—not just foreign patents held by Intellectual Ventures but also
US patents held by the company. For example, we happened upon two examples of this in finding a
set of US patents that Intellectual Ventures obtained from two foreign companies, only because the
transactions with the shell companies were mentioned in documents published by the foreign
company that we discovered during our research.31
Based on the information above, we assume that the typical Intellectual Ventures US patent has
also been filed in two to four foreign jurisdictions as well. Extrapolating only from the US patents,
and not taking into account any patents Intellectual Venture may have acquired that were filed only
in foreign jurisdictions, the worldwide portfolio would be roughly 20,000-40,000 patents32 and 9,00018,000 applications, by May 2011. Thus, adding the estimated number of patents and patent
applications together would suggest a portfolio that ranges from approximately 29,000 to 58,000
patents and applications worldwide. This range is, of course, an estimate, although a reasonably
conservative one. Nevertheless, even these figures would place Intellectual Ventures among the 5th
largest patent portfolio holders in the United States and among the 15th largest patent portfolio
holders worldwide.
C. Origins of the Portfolio

¶36

¶37

We were able to find evidence that Intellectual Ventures has engaged in more than 1000
acquisition transactions. Through these transactions, the company has acquired inventions and
related intellectual property from individual inventors, corporations of all sizes, governments,
research laboratories, and universities.33
Intellectual Ventures states that its portfolio has been built through transactions variously
classified as “strategic acquisitions,” “targeted acquisitions,” and “in-bound market-driven”
opportunities. We suspect that some of the larger transactions also arise in conjunction with an
investment in Intellectual Ventures by the party supplying the patents. The targeted acquisitions are
purposeful acquisitions based on either rounding out or completing a portion of Intellectual
Ventures’ portfolio or a targeted growth area for the future.
1. Acquisitions Through University Transactions

¶38

The transactions with universities are particularly interesting, not necessarily as a percentage of
the company’s portfolio, but as offering insight into Intellectual Ventures’ vision and potential effects
on innovation. The company has announced that it has relationships with some 400 universities,
although it has not identified all the institutions involved.34 These relationships are not necessarily
public because they may involve patents whose ownership remains with the university. For example,
30 Additionally, some patent owners continue to count provisional applications and PCT applications as being part of their
portfolios long after these applications have expired. Similarly, some patent owners double count their EPO patents by counting
the EPO-published patent applications while also counting the applications’ counterpart issued patents throughout Europe.
Finally, many patent owners do not distinguish patents granted by examination systems from patents granted by registration
systems, which causes further confusion. In short, it is easy to inflate the numbers of a patent portfolio once international filing
occurs. Discussing “patent families” helps somewhat, although there are also ways making a portfolio appear to have more
families than it has in actuality.
31 The two foreign companies noted here are Campinas and Torino Wireless.
32 This “worldwide” estimate includes the US patents.
33 Intellectual Ventures often gives the impression that much of its portfolio has been built by acquiring one or two patents
from small inventors. In reviewing the transactions that we know about, we have found the following distribution of first-level
sellers: Small and Medium Enterprises, 36.5%; Individual inventors, 25.7%; Large Companies, 15.8%; Consultants and brokerages,
14.3%; Universities, 5.3%; and Governments, 2.4%. The largest transactions in terms of number of patents involved have come
from large companies and governments.
34 Intellectual Ventures Worldwide, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://intellectualventures.com/WhoWeAre/Worldwide.aspx
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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the company may simply receive an exclusive license to commercialize the intellectual property
involved, which would not necessarily appear as a recorded transfer of ownership. Nevertheless, we
were able to find nearly 50 universities that appear to have signed deals with Intellectual Ventures,
which we have listed at Appendix A. Some deals may involve sale or licensing of a few patents, some
may involve investment by the university in Intellectual Ventures, and some may involve wholesale
assignment of future innovation.
We did find one fascinating example of the wholesale assignment of innovation with an
institution in a developing nation and have heard that this may represent a pattern. Specifically, we
found a summary of an agreement with Brazil’s Campinas University, one of that country’s largest
academic institutions. In that agreement, Intellectual Ventures appears to have secured the rights to
file Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent applications for inventions developed at the university.
In other words, the university may file domestic patent applications in its own country, and then
Intellectual Ventures has the right to file PCT applications and secure worldwide rights to the
inventions. The agreement appears to provide some revenue-share potential with the university as
the result of Intellectual Ventures’ commercialization, although we were not able to determine the
specific terms and conditions.
We have been told that similar deals exist with universities in other developing countries. It is
certainly a forward-looking approach towards gathering rights to future innovation, but it is one that
could backfire on the company. Suppose, for example, that some individuals at academic institutions
become unhappy with the deal and respond by creating very little that would fall within the terms of
the agreement for the period of the agreement or by simply devoting their efforts to non-patentable
activities. That would be a bad result on all levels—for the academic institution, for Intellectual
Ventures, and for innovation as a whole.
2. Acquisition Through Portfolio Assumption

¶41

¶42

Another source of patents for Intellectual Ventures comes from offering a turnkey licensing
service for small-to-medium enterprises. Consider, for example, the deal that Intellectual Ventures
completed with the Digimarc Corporation in 2010. According to Digimarc’s SEC filings, the
company has granted Intellectual Ventures an exclusive license with the right to sublicense almost all
of Digimarc’s patents.35
The broad terms of Digimarc’s deal with IV are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

¶43

a license issue fee of $36 million, paid in increasing quarterly installments over three
years;
20% of the profits generated from the IV’s licensing program, less expenses that include
the license issue fee above;
IV assumes responsibility for approximately $1 million per year in prosecution and
maintenance costs previously borne by Digimarc for the licensed patents;
a minimum of $4 million of paid support over five years from Digimarc to assist IV in
licensing-related efforts; and
a royalty-free grant-back license to the licensed patents to continue Digimarc’s existing
business related to those assets.

Thus, Intellectual Ventures buys the rights to most of Digimarc’s patents, assumes the costs of
maintaining the portfolio, and gains the right to go after other companies. Digimarc gets a cash
payment plus a percentage of income earned when Intellectual Ventures goes after other companies

35 The deal includes 597 patents and 288 patent applications owned by Digimarc. The company has retained 4 patents and
128 patent applications, as well as 26 patents and 26 patent applications for which it holds rights with third parties.
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with the portfolio. Digimarc also retains a license to use the patents, as long as the use relates to its
existing business.
C. Funding Sources
¶44

¶45

¶46

To finance its acquisitions and operations, Intellectual Ventures has raised at least $5 billion,
according to published reports.36 The company’s initial funding seems to have come from operating
companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony, Nokia, Apple, Google, and eBay. Subsequent funding
sources include financial investors, comprised heavily of institutional endowments and wealthy
individuals. These include the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the University of Pennsylvania,
the University of Notre Dame, Grinnell College, and Charles River Ventures. The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation has asked Intellectual Ventures to perform some contract research related to
antimalarial devices; as far as we can tell, this is the only physical product made by the company,
apart from some prototype work in a nuclear reactor co-invented by Myhrvold.37
Intellectual Ventures’ investments are distributed among more than five funds, and the investors
have not necessarily invested in each fund or in each fund equally.38 In litigation against Xilinx in May
2011, Intellectual Ventures was forced to disclose the investors for four of its funds. In addition to
the initial funding group mentioned above, investors included Amazon.com, American Express,
Adobe, Cisco, Verizon, and Yahoo!, as well as Xilinx itself.39
According to Myhrvold, the funds raised by Intellectual Ventures are in the form of capital
commitments that the company can use over a certain time period. The company claims that it has
been structured to operate in a manner resembling that of venture capital and private equity funds.
Thus, the company strives to receive approximately a 2% management fee plus 20% on the carried
interest,40 although actual terms from may vary significantly from fund to fund and acquisition to
acquisition.
D. Return on Investment

¶47

One of the most interesting questions about mass aggregators, and one that is difficult to
generalize, is what do investors get in return? The investors vary tremendously, as do the types of
deals they are likely to have made. Some investors appear to be interested both in financial returns
and in access to Intellectual Ventures’ vast pool of patents.41 As Vincent Pluvinage, Intellectual
Ventures’ former head of acquisitions, once explained, for investors that are technology companies,
Intellectual Ventures can provide a defensive function in the form of access to patent licenses.42
Pluvinage has stated, in fact, that some technology company investors have indicated specific

36 Investing in Invention, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://intellectualventures.com/WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Nov. 15,
2011); Defendants’ Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-16 and FRCP 7.1, Xilinx, Inc. v.
Invention Investment Fund 1 LP, No. 11-CV-0671-SI (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
37 The Need for Innovation in Energy, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES,
http://intellectualventures.com/OurInventions/TerraPower.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011); John Letzing, Myhrvold’s Patent Firm
Sees Revenue Swell, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 4, 2011, 1:58 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/myhrvolds-patent-firm-seesrevenue-swell-2011-03-04.
38 These funds include: the Invention Science Fund I LLC; the Invention Science Inventors Fund I, LLC; Invention Science
Management Fund I, LLC; the Invention Development Fund I LLC; the Invention Investment Fund I LP, the Invention
Investment Fund II LLC, the Intellectual Ventures Fund I, and the Intellectual Ventures Fund II.
39 The full list of investors in the four funds is listed at Appendix B.
40 Page, supra note 22, at 10.
41 For example, Verizon paid $350 million for patent licenses and an equity stake in one of Intellectual Ventures’ investment
funds in July 2008, according to published reports. See, e.g., Law.com - Verizon Patent Case Marks a First for Intellectual Ventures, LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY TODAY (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.legaltechtoday.com/2010/02/26/law-com-verizon-patent-case-marks-a-firstfor-intellectual-ventures-2/. Intuit similarly struck a $120 million deal with Intellectual Ventures in early 2009. See, e.g., Zusha
Elinson, Intellectual Ventures and Intuit Work Out $120 Million Licensing Deal, Say Sources, THE RECORDER (June 24, 2009), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202431711930&slreturn=1.
42 For a description of using patents as bargaining chips in infringement litigation, see infra text accompanying note 169.
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technology areas where they would like Intellectual Ventures to acquire patent rights in order to
obtain license rights.43
Another category of investors, however, would have little interest in access to patents. For
example, one would not expect the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation or the World Bank to be
particularly interested in patent licenses. In fact, Pluvinage confirmed that the company has some
purely financial investors, and financial investors typically have no need for patent licenses. Pluvinage
believes that the financial investors have chosen Intellectual Ventures and the general category of
intellectual property as an investment because it’s believed to be uncorrelated to other investment
classes.
For investors who get access to the patent pool, that access provides something far more
sophisticated and complex than the patent licenses that would be necessary to produce a product.44
Consider the story of Verizon, which paid $350 million for patent licenses and an equity stake in one
of the Intellectual Ventures Funds in 2008. TiVo sued Verizon for infringement.45 Verizon purchased
a patent from one of Intellectual Ventures’ shell companies, which was then put to work as a
counterclaim in the TiVo suit46 in a program that Intellectual Ventures calls “IP for Defense.”47
One can see a similar progression with Vlingo. Nuance Communications sued Vlingo for
infringement. At the time of the lawsuit, Vlingo’s portfolio contained mostly pending applications.48
With this type of portfolio, a company would have nothing available for countersuit. Vlingo didn’t
buy just one patent, as Verizon did, it bought seven patents from Intellectual Ventures and used five
of them to sue Nuance. Thus, with both Vlingo and Verizon, the company was able to purchase the
patents needed for leverage in litigation, just at the time it was needed.49
Such transactions would be even more interesting if the arrangements allowed the purchaser to
sell the patent back to the aggregator at the conclusion of the litigation.50 This would resemble a
leasing program, or perhaps a form of a patent library, in which those who invest in mass aggregators
could obtain just the right patent needed at just the right moment, returning the patent when the
need has passed. The purchaser might even be able to make a profit on the transaction, given that a
litigation-tested patent is presumably more valuable than an untested patent.
Access to a vast patent pool could be enormously valuable to a technology company, but one
must be careful of the hand that feeds. When infringement litigation broke out between Intellectual

43 Page, supra note 22, at 11 (quoting Pluvinage’s statement that financial investors invest in Intellectual Ventures because
“it’s uncorrelated and long term.” For strategic investors, Intellectual Ventures offers a “defensive function,” including the ability
to tell Intellectual Ventures “which technology domain they want access to”).
44 We do not know if Intellectual Ventures’ licenses are perpetual or require recurring royalty payments.
45 Tivo sued Verizon on August 26, 2009. TiVo Inc. v. Verizon Comm’cns, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-257, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112320 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 26, 2009).
46 The Intellectual Ventures shell was originally named Aerosound LLC before a recordation of its name change was made
with the USPTO on February 17, 2010. See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB,
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “5410344”). It is uncertain precisely when
Verizon bought this patent, as the transaction has not been recorded at the USPTO; however, the counterclaim was added on
February 24, 2010, and Verizon asserts that all rights in the ‘344 patent have been acquired by a wholly owned subsidiary named
Services Corp. See Defendant’s Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaims at 15, Tivo, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns,
Inc., No. 2:09-CV-257-DF (E.D. Tex. 2010). The USPTO assignment database shows no patents assigned to “Services Corp.” See
USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” for
“Services Corp”).
47 Value-Added Solutions & Services, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES,
http://www.intven.com/ProductsServices/Licensing/ValueAddedProducts.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2011.).
48 Vlingo also had two purchased patents, one from RPX and one from Nuance.
49 Intellectual Ventures Moblcomm 1 LLC sold US Patent No. 5,680,388 to Apple, Inc. on March 7, 2011. The patent was
originally owned by mobile telephony pioneer TeliaSonera. The patent, entitled “Method and Arrangement for Dynamic Allocation
of Multiple Carrier-Wave Channels for Multiple Access by Frequency Division of Multiplexing” pertains to a level of
telecommunications infrastructure not likely to have emerged from Apple’s own organic R&D programs. The patent does not yet
appear to be involved in the emerging smartphone patent wars. See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB,
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “5680388”).
50 One Intellectual Ventures executive told one of the authors that the option to repurchase was a term of the Verizon deal,
but we have not been able to independently verify this.
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Ventures and Xilinx in 2011, it was interesting to note that Xilinx itself is listed as an Intellectual
Ventures investor.
Xilinx had filed a declaratory judgment suit against Intellectual Ventures after Intellectual
Ventures sued three of Xilinx’ competitors. One cannot help but wonder what might have transpired
between Intellectual Ventures and its investors that led the parties to litigation under these
circumstances. No information is available, but one could imagine that the following might have
happened. Perhaps Xilinx’s agreement with Intellectual Ventures includes that Xilinx purchases both
an interest in the Intellectual Ventures investment fund and a license to use some of Intellectual
Ventures’ patents on a true-up basis. If the license royalty is based on sales data from Xilinx, and
Intellectual Ventures began to doubt that Xilinx was properly reporting its data or to dispute that
data, one could see the infringement suits against Xilinx’s competitors as serving a dual purpose. The
suits have the potential to both bring in settlement money from Xilinx’s competitors and to send a
message to Xilinx that Intellectual Ventures has confidence in its patents and is serious about its
demands. Under that scenario, the Xilinx suit, in which Xilinx asks the court to declare the
Intellectual Ventures’ patent either invalid or not infringed by Xilinx, coupled with a Xilinx discovery
request that has the effect of publicly revealing a list of the Intellectual Ventures investors, can be
seen as Xilinx’s cannon shot reply.
1. Capital Returns

¶54

¶55

¶56

¶57

One of the most striking figures to consider is the amount of revenue Intellectual Ventures will
need to generate if it is going to operate successfully in the venture capital model it has selected for
itself, paying acceptable profits to its investors as well as its principals. In particular, Intellectual
Ventures defines itself in comparison to venture capital and private equity firms. Venture Capital
firms typically must provide profits to their investors that substantially exceed those of other
investments in order to be considered successful. Venture capital funds tend to be extremely illiquid,
with lifetimes of approximately 7-10 years during which the investor’s capital is often unavailable.
This illiquidity is one justification for higher expected returns than the returns from more liquid
investments.
None of Intellectual Ventures’ network of companies is public, and Intellectual Ventures has not
precisely distinguished publicly which part of its corporate network is the “VC firm/fund” part and
which part is the “VC investment” part. The typical venture capital company invests in unrelated
businesses whose origin does not trace back through to the general partners who created the
investment fund. In the absence of an explanation, we will assume that the VC fund part comprises
shell companies like the Invention Investment Fund I LP, and the VC investment part comprises
patent-owning shell companies like Ferrara Ethereal LLC. We are also uncertain if any restrictions
have been placed on the ability of the limited partners (the investors) in the VC fund portion to sell
their shares to third parties. In the absence of being listed on a public exchange, even if these shares
can be sold, they are less liquid than shares in public companies and may possibly have additional
restrictions that render them even more illiquid.
Myhrvold, Detkin, and other Intellectual Ventures executives have repeatedly described the
company as a venture capital or private equity company operating in the intellectual property rights
space. Given the comparison that Intellectual Ventures has chosen for itself, combined with the wellheeled investors the company has drawn, and in consideration of the other investments these
investors could have made instead, one could presume that the institutional investors assumed that
Intellectual Ventures intends to pay them profits at least comparable to those of a successful venture
capital or private equity firm. Some of the institutional investors may also have been intrigued with
intellectual property rights as an asset class in a diversified portfolio.
The minimum return, given the risk and illiquidity that investors in venture capital or private
equity firms expect in the United States is approximately 20%, especially in the era preceding the
financial crisis when many of Intellectual Ventures’ funds were raised. In Intellectual Ventures’ case,
this may well be a very conservative number. Investors often look for comparable investments in
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determining risk. Acacia Research Corp., a public patent rights licensing company and therefore
more liquid than a typical VC investment, probably provides the closest comparable to an investment
in Intellectual Ventures. During the 2002-2007 time period, when many of Intellectual Ventures’
funds were likely being raised, Acacia’s shares grew more than 30% per year on average without any
consideration of dividends paid by Acacia which would also be part of its value growth. Over the
2002-2011 time period, Acacia’s shares grew by even more. All things being equal, one might expect
that a rational investor would choose to make a more liquid and less risky investment in Acacia’s
stock, than an illiquid and riskier investment in Intellectual Ventures—unless Intellectual Ventures
had the promise of substantially greater returns. Nevertheless, we will use a conservative 20% return
for our calculations of Intellectual Ventures’ minimum expected return to investors. Intellectual
Ventures has said that of the money it makes from the investors’ capital, it intends to keep 20% of
the profit for itself as carried interest and that it will also charge a 1-2% management fee calculated as
a percentage of capital raised. We will use the figure 1.5% as an average management fee for
simplicity. Therefore, the total expected minimum revenue needed to generate anticipated profits for
the investors and Intellectual Ventures as well as paying the management fees would need to be a
little over 25% per year.
Although the length of investment is an unknown parameter, assume a 10-year investment
lifetime, which is not uncommon in the venture capital world.51 Combining these parameters with $5
billion in investment would yield a lifetime revenue expectation for all the funds of roughly $40
billion to be considered a minimally successful investment. This calculation assumes that investors
receive the profits at the end of the fund’s lifetime. If one assumes that the funds have lifetimes
longer than 10 years, then the revenue expectations grow substantially larger. If, for example,
Intellectual Ventures has pegged the revenue expectations at the 20-year lifetime of a patent, the
lifetime expectation for the funds jumps to a minimum of $244 billion in order to generate the
expected profits and cover management fees and capital costs.
These calculations assume that all of Intellectual Ventures’ $5 billion in investment commitments
have actually been received and invested by the company. Intellectual Ventures has been somewhat
coy about how much of the $5 billion it has actually received. If it receives just $1.5 billion from
investors (a mere 30% of the reported commitments), then the 10-year revenue expectations still
amount to $12 billion,52 an amount comparable to the amount that IBM will receive from intellectual
property rights royalties over the same time period.53
E. Collecting Revenue: Privateering & Other Exploits

¶60

¶61

Intellectual Ventures claims to have collected approximately $2 billion in licensing fees so far,
based on the company’s disclosures and recent licensing deals.54 Most large-scale IP licensing today
exists only among very large technology companies, and this is consistent with Intellectual Ventures’
licensing efforts at this point. Myhrvold, however, told the Wall Street Journal in 2008, that the
company ultimately plans to sign up hundreds or even thousands of companies as patent licensees.
Intellectual Ventures has recently begun describing its services as bridging “the invention gap.”
So, in a delightful metaphorical twist, the ugly troll under the bridge now works to help the goats
over the stream (although the goats presumably still tender a cash award to the helpful troll).
51 Venture capital firms generally require long-term investments in which the investor does not expect returns for 7-10 years.
FAQ, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147&id=119&option=com_content&view=article (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). There is a
20% minimum venture capital fund return. See BASIL PETERS, EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ANGEL INVESTORS 19 (2009),
http://www.basilpeters.com/Presentations/Exit_Strategies_for_Angel_Investors_20090415_Part_1.pdf.
52 $1.5 billion would presumably be expected to generate $153 billion over a 20-year period.
53 As a comparison, Intellectual Ventures has fewer than 800 employees; IBM has 427,000 employees.
54 Intellectual Ventures’ Licensing Overview Data Sheet for July, 2011 indicates they have collected $2 billion in licensing
revenue. Global Licensing Overview, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/Libraries/General/Licensing_Overview_Data_Sheet_July.sflb.ashx (last visited Nov. 15,
2011).
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Until recently, Intellectual Ventures used third parties to carry out much of its litigation activities.
The technique is reminiscent of the historic practice known as privateering. Privateering was an
extremely effective and troubling method of waging war, which was finally abolished by treaty in
1856.55 It allowed governments to issue a “letter of marque and reprisal” to private parties, which
allowed their ships to 1) capture any ships carrying the enemy’s flag, 2) sell the ship and cargo at
auction, and 3) keep the proceeds. Privateering allowed governments to enlist private parties in their
aggressive activities so that the country could wage war with no impact on the treasury.
With Intellectual Ventures’ version of privateering, the company sells a patent to a more
aggressive licensing company, retaining a license for the Intellectual Ventures investors. The new
owner is free to sue or license anyone not covered by the previous owner. The approach allows
Intellectual Ventures to profit indirectly from the litigation without engaging in the expenditures or
the risks of litigation.
Privateering could be a very effective way of nudging reluctant licensees in the following manner.
An aggregator approaches a company, and demands that the company license one of the aggregator’s
patents. When the company demurs, the aggregator sells the patent to an aggressive third party, who
sues for a far higher license value. The aggregate then approaches the company again, this time
demanding that the company license a different one of the aggregator’s patents. This time, the
company may be much more compliant.
The approach could also be used to prod one’s own licensees to toe the line, as speculated with
the Xilinx circumstances above. Specifically, if the licensee must make payments to the aggregator
based on the licensee’s sales volume, and the aggregator believes that the licensee is being less than
candid, the aggregator could sponsor an aggressive action by one of its proxies against a competitor
of the licensee as a way to demonstrate potential consequences to its recalcitrant licensee. This
approach would be reminiscent of the old Chinese adage of “kill the chicken to frighten the
monkey.”
While we do not know the deal terms, we did, however, find many examples of Intellectual
Ventures using third-party proxies to litigate infringement claims against companies who appear to
be likely licensing targets for large portions of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio. In particular, many of
the patents sold by Intellectual Ventures have ended up in litigations brought by their new acquirers.
Patents formerly owned by apparent Intellectual Ventures shells Viviana LLC,56 Gisel Assets KG
LLC,57 Kwon Holdings Group LLC,58 SF IP Properties 24 LLC,59 Ferrara Ethereal LLC,60 and
Mission Abstract Data LLC61 have been employed in patent infringement litigations respectively
brought by the purchasers Picture Frame Innovations LLC,62 Patent Harbor LLC,63 Oasis Research
55 One of the authors has previously discussed the similarity between historic privateering and the activities of modern nonpracticing entities. See generally Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors: IP
Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. (forthcoming Winter 2011). The treaty abolishing
privateering is the Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, U.K.-France, April 16, 1856,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument.
56 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “Viviana”).
57 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “Gisel Assets”).
58 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “Kwon Holdings”).
59 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “S.F. IP Properties 24”).
60 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “Ferrara Ethereal”).
61 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “Mission Abstract”), and subsequent assignment from Intellectual Ventures Audio Data LLC. Intellectual Ventures also
continues to sell patents, such as the recent sale from Intellectual Ventures’ Sinon Data LLC to Personal Voice Freedom LLC, a
company apparently associated with Charles Eldering’s Technology, Patents, and Licensing Inc.
62 See, e.g., Picture Frame Innovations, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:2009-CV-04888 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 10, 2009).
(Intellectual Ventures generally denies publicly having any involvement in this litigation. Nevertheless, we note that in the litigation,
Kodak argued that Picture Frame lacked the right to sue, given rights in the patent retained by Viviana and/or Intellectual
Ventures. Kodak’s counsel termed the Picture Frame’s agreement “a hunting license” in motions filed before the court. The case
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LLC,64 InMotion Imagery Technologies, LLC,65 Webvention LLC,66 and Mission Abstract Data
LLC.67 These litigations have been brought against companies such as Kodak, Hewlett Packard,
Samsung and CBS Radio. Don Merino, senior vice president of licensing at Intellectual Ventures has
said the sales were a logical step for the company and essentially denied that they related to
privateering.68 “I have enough of a set of assets where it just makes sense to start turning inventory,”
he told Dow Jones in a 2010 interview.69 Selling expiring assets makes perfect business sense, of
course. Nevertheless, the technique could be used, both to maximize aggressive litigation returns
while attempting to stay at arm’s length, as well as reinforcing the message to one’s own license
targets that cooperation is the better strategy.70 In addition, when the extent of the patent portfolio is
unclear, the technique could be used to hint to targets that the patent being offered for licensing is
only one piece of a more extensive portfolio in that area.
In another example of using third parties for infringement litigation, Avistar Communications
sold a group of 41 patents and applications to Intellectual Ventures Fund 61 in December of 2009
for $11 million.71 In June of the following year, Intellectual Ventures re-sold these patents to
Pragmatus.72 Five months later, Pragmatus used three of these patents to sue Facebook, YouTube,
LinkedIn, and PhotoBucket.com for patent infringement.
Pragmatus has also filed infringement lawsuits against the major United States cable companies,
including Time Warner Cable, Cox Cable, Charter Communications, and Comcast, for infringement
of two additional patents that were acquired from Intellectual Ventures prior to that lawsuit.73 An
Intellectual Ventures shell company had acquired these patents in 2007 as part of a larger patent lot
purchased at an Ocean Tomo patent auction for $3.025 million.74 While Intellectual Ventures
probably does not own Pragmatus, it is not presently clear if Intellectual Ventures sold the patents
for a lump sum cash payment or whether it is entitled to receive a percentage of the
commercialization profits, including patent infringement damage awards and settlements. Deal terms
comprising an upfront cash payment plus a revenue share seem fairly common in the patent
marketplace generally.75
The activities described above are only some examples of Intellectual Ventures’ transfers to third
parties for the purpose of intellectual property rights exploitation through litigation and/or licensing
that we came across.76 We suspect there may be many more examples.
settled in January of 2011 without rulings on Kodak’s motions, and the terms of the settlement have not been made public.)
63 See, e.g., Patent Harbor, LLC v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 6:2010-CV-00436 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 20, 2010).
64 See, e.g., Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, LLC, No. 4:2010-CV-00435 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2010).
65 See, e.g., InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. JVC Ams., Corp., No. 2:2010-CV-00474 (E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 10, 2010).
66 See, e.g., Webvention LLC v. Adidas Am. Inc., No. 2:2010-CV-00410 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 5, 2010).
67 See, e.g., Mission Abstract Data LLC v. Beasley Broad. Grp. Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00176-LPS (D. Del. filed Mar. 1, 2011). Note
that a Rule 7.1 filing in Mission Abstract Data states that the sole owner of this plaintiff is Digimedia Holdings, LLC, a Delaware
entity formed in January, 2011 just a few weeks prior to the assignment of patents from Intellectual Ventures Audio Data LLC.
One could conclude that Mission Abstract Data has different owners now than it did prior to the transaction with Intellectual
Ventures Audio Data LLC. Mission Abstract Data LLC was formed as a company in April, 2007.
68 Stuart Weinberg, Intellectual Ventures Patent Divestitures Continue, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Feb. 24, 2010; see also Tom Ewing,
Introducing the Patent Privateers, 45 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 31, 36 (2011).
69 Weinberg, supra note 68.
70 While discussing the merits of litigation versus licensing, Peter Detkin said, “litigation is a highly inefficient way to do
licensing. But let’s not lose sight that litigation is just licensing by other means.” Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5.
71 According to Avistar’s SEC filings, the complete transaction involved 99 US and foreign patents and 26 pending
applications worldwide. Avistar Commc’ns, Annual Report (Form 10-K), Exhibit 10.39 (Mar. 30, 2010).
72 These are the only patents whose ownership has been recorded to Pragmatus.
73 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number”
for “5581479” and “5636139”) (showing patent rights passing from Lot 20 to Intellectual Ventures to Pragmatus).
74 See Highlights of Ocean Tomo Spring 2007 Intellectual Property Auction, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (May 2007),
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/Ocean_Tomo.pdf (disclosing that maximum lot price was $3.025 million); see also
supra note 73.
75 Peter Detkin said, “We sell for some amount of money up front, and we get some percentage of the royalty stream down
the road that is generated from these assets.” Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5.
76 See, e.g., InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. Notorious Prods., Inc., No. 2:2011-CV-00415 (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 15, 2011);
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After primarily using third parties to file infringement litigations, Intellectual Ventures began
suing companies directly in December 2010. On a single day, Intellectual Ventures filed three large
patent litigations: one against a group of software security companies, one against DRAM and flash
memory manufacturers, and one against field programmable gate array (FPGA) manufacturers.77 The
company has filed additional infringement suits against the parties in other jurisdictions including the
International Trade Commission.
F. Other Mass Aggregators & Interconnections

¶71

Intellectual Ventures’ success in raising capital has led to the creation of a number of smaller
versions of the company. We will discuss a few such organizations briefly. It is unclear whether and
to what extent Intellectual Ventures has partnered with these companies, but there are a number of
striking connections and interactions among them. It is possible that Intellectual Ventures maintains
ties to such other organizations as a way of lowering its exposure for various deals. In addition, with
the amount of capital at Intellectual Ventures’ disposal, it would make sense for the company to
make some investments of its own.
1. Acacia Research Corporation

¶72

¶73

Acacia Research Corporation likely represents the first modern mass aggregator. Acacia is the
largest publicly traded patent-licensing company, and has executed more than 1,000 license
agreements across 104 of technology licensing programs.78 The company’s operating subsidiaries (a
suite of limited liability companies) own or control the rights to more than 180 patent portfolios.79
These portfolios relate to technologies from consumer electronics to automotive technologies and
from medical devices to security technologies. Acacia’s licensees include companies as diverse as 3M,
Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Bloomberg, Nokia, and the Walt Disney Company.80 Acacia recently began a
turnkey licensing program for operating companies whose operations now include licensing more
than 40,000 patents owned by Renesas, the world’s third-largest semiconductor company.81
Acacia has been among the most litigious of the non-practicing entities. According to one report,
the company and its subsidiaries have been plaintiffs in 280 patent lawsuits and defendants
(presumably from declaratory judgment actions) in still more litigations.82 Early Acacia licensing
assertions related to a portfolio of patents relating to audio and video transmission and receiving
systems, commonly known as audio-on-demand and video-on-demand.

InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. LFP Video Group, LLC, No. 2:2011-CV-00261 (E.D. Tex. filed May 19, 2011); Patent Harbor,
LLC v. Dreamworks Animation, Inc., No. 6:2011-CV-00229 (E.D. Tex. filed May 9, 2011); Patent Harbor, LLC v. Twentieth
Century Fox Home Entm’t, LLC, No. 6:2010-CV-00607 (E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 16, 2010); Patent Harbor, LLC v. Audiovox Corp.,
No. 6:2010-CV-00361 (E.D. Tex. filed July 21, 2010); InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. Penthouse Digital Media Prods., Inc., No.
2:2010-CV-00084 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 10, 2010). We have not checked all of Intellectual Ventures’ 11,000 US patents to see
which ones have been sold to third parties, but we suspect that Intellectual Ventures has sold more patents than the ones identified
here.
77 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 1:2011-CV-00792 (D. Del. filed Sept. 9, 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Altera Corp., No. 1:2010-CV-01065 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No.
1:2010-CV-01066 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010).
78
See
Acacia,
Quarterly
Report
(Form
10-Q)
(June
30,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/934549/000093454911000016/actg10q063011.htm.
79 Id. (noting that “Acacia’s only identifiable intangible assets at June 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010 are patents and patent
rights. Patent-related accumulated amortization totaled $33,058,000 and $31,198,000 as of June 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010,
respectively.”).
80 Investment Profile, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP. (October 2011),
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/docs/AcaciaFactSheet.pdf ((last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
81 Press Release, Renesas Electronics And Acacia Research Enter Into Strategic Patent Licensing Alliance (Aug. 24, 2010),
available at http://www.renesas.com/press/news/2010/news20100824.jsp. (Renesas is an entity formed by the merging of the
semiconductor businesses of three Japanese companies—Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and NEC.)
82 Daniel P. McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System, SCIENCE PROGRESS (Jan. 12, 2009),
http://scienceprogress.org/2009/01/patent-trolls-erode-patent-system/.
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Acacia83 has been a public company for nearly 10 years, and counts among its investors
household mutual fund managers like Oppenheimer Funds, Fidelity, and the Vanguard Group.84 The
company’s stock has generally followed a steadily upward trend. From the beginnings of public trade
in the ACTG stock on Dec. 17, 2002, the shares have risen from $1.85/share to $40.28/share by
Sept. 27, 2011, representing a 36%/year rise over the 2002-2011 period.85
Acacia, which began operations in 1993, initially had two branches, one branch that made
products and another branch that licensed patent rights, initially to V-chip technology.86 Over time,
the product-making side of the company, which produced a system for rapid creation of DNA and
other compounds on a programmable semiconductor chip, has somewhat diminished in significance.
In August 2010, a wholly owned subsidiary of Acacia became the general partner of the Acacia
Intellectual Property Fund, L.P. (the “Acacia IP Fund”), which was formed in August 2010. The
Acacia IP Fund is authorized to raise up to $250 million.87 The Acacia IP Fund aims to follow in the
patent-licensing work that Acacia has pioneered.
2. Transpacific IP Ltd.

¶77

¶78

¶79

¶80

¶81

Transpacific IP Ltd. began operations in Taiwan in 2004 and has expanded to include offices in
Hong Kong, Beijing, Tokyo and Singapore. Unlike the typical intellectual property aggregator,
Transpacific seems to have kept a very low profile with a fairly nondescript website and only a few
news stories about the company.
Despite its low profile, the company has amassed a portfolio of more than 3,000 US patents and
applications.88 The company has purchased these patents from Asian companies as well as US
companies. It is possible that Transpacific and Intellectual Ventures conducted some sort of business
arrangement with each other in late 2007 or early 2008, although the terms and the timing are
unclear. During this time period, a number of Transpacific’s patents seem to have shifted to new
intellectual property attorneys who also appear to represent Intellectual Ventures for patent
prosecution matters.
We initially found Transpacific while searching for Intellectual Ventures shell companies but
concluded that Transpacific is probably not an Intellectual Ventures shell, given that it seems to have
its own corporate identity. Transpacific’s corporate structure seems to resemble that of Intellectual
Ventures but in miniature, including a number of shell companies of its own.
Intellectual Ventures has purchased patents from Transpacific and its shells. For example, two of
the patents Intellectual Ventures is using in its spate of direct infringement lawsuits filed at the end of
2010 were purchased from Transpacific.89 The transaction was characterized as a merger in
documents filed with the USPTO.
We noted above that Transpacific and Intellectual Ventures often share the same patent counsel.
The sharing is so close that in one instance, a patent practitioner mistakenly filed a power of attorney
signed by a Transpacific representative in the prosecution file for a seemingly unrelated Intellectual
Trading as ACTG on the NASDAQ exchange.
See Shareholders Major ACTG Acacia Research Corporation Shareholders, MORNINGSTAR,
http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-major.html?t=ACTG&region=USA&culture=en-us (click tab for
“Institutions”).
85 This rise does not include any dividends paid during this period. See Acacia Research (ACTG) from Dec. 16, 2002 to Sept.
27, 2011, GOOGLE FINANCE,
http://www.google.com/finance/historical?cid=681024&startdate=Jul%205%2C%202001&enddate=Oct%204%2C%202011&n
um=30&start=2220# (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
86 See, e.g., Acacia Technologies Licenses Digital Media Transmission Technology to NXTV, ACACIA RESEARCH (Jan. 2, 2004),
http://www.acaciaresearch.com/pr/010204NXTV.pdf.
87 Acacia, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://biz.yahoo.com/e/101101/actg10-q.html.
88 Plus an even greater number of non-US patents/applications.
89 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp., No. 1:2010-CV-01065 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No. 1:2010-CV-01066 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010); USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB,
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “6260087” and “5687325”) (showing
Transpacific’s involvement in the assignment of these patents to Intellectual Ventures).
83
84

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us

17

Ventures shell company, a mistake one would not expect to see with completely unrelated
portfolios.90
3. RPX
¶82

¶83

¶84

John Amster founded RPX in September 2008. Just prior to founding the company, Mr. Amster
was Intellectual Ventures’ general manager of strategic acquisitions and vice president of licensing.
RPX’s business model is to buy potentially problematic trolling patents and then license those
patents to its members. Thus, the company’s members can head off the problems of intellectual
property infringement litigation for a fraction of the cost. The company has grown rapidly, with
annual revenues now in excess of $65 million. RPX held its initial public stock offering in 2011.
It is possible that some of Intellectual Ventures’ investors wanted to participate in an aggregator
that overtly operated as a patent defense fund, and a fund limited more to areas directly related to its
investors’ businesses and interests, and that RPX was formed to fill this market need. The patents
that RPX acquires tend to be somewhat more along the lines of nuisance value patent than the
patents that Intellectual Ventures acquires, and it is possible that the two companies may not often
find themselves competing for the purchase of a given patent. At present, RPX has signed up
approximately 65 technology companies, about half of which have either sold patents to Intellectual
Ventures or have invested in Intellectual Ventures.91
RPX has spent over $300 million acquiring patents and controls them via several funds, such as
RPX-LV Acquisition LLC and RPX-NW Acquisition LLC. However, while RPX licenses or buys
patents for its current members, it does not always retain rights to these patents and acknowledges
that the patents could later be used by other potentially litigious owners to bring suits against
companies that were not members of RPX at the time in which it engaged in those licenses.92 RPX
subscribers apparently do not enjoy a perpetual license to patents owned by the firm until after a
three-year licensing period, which may inhibit a member from leaving RPX as patents acquired inside
the three-year window may become unlicensed.93
4. Round Rock Research

¶85

Round Rock Research, LLC holds a portfolio of more than 3,400 US patents. All of these
patents were acquired from Micron Technology in December 2009 and collectively represent roughly
20% of Micron’s total patent assets. The company was incorporated in Delaware nearly a year before
it was publicly announced that John Desmarais, a prominent US patent litigator, would lead the
company.94 It was also formed nearly a year before the 3,400 patents were transferred from Micron
to Round Rock.
90 The power of attorney filed for US Patent No. 7,427,742 on Sept. 2, 2010 is for Tang Sung Capital, a TransPacific IP shell,
when the correct owner of the patent is Intellectual Ventures’ shell Buvane Holdings. A power of attorney for Buvane was filed in
the case on Jan. 11, 2011. We note that nothing in the assignment history for the ‘742 patent indicates that it was ever owned by a
TransPacific shell. In contrast, IV has done numerous transactions with Cypress Semiconductor, the patent’s previous owner.
Thus, it would seem that the patent prosecutor was simply confused about which power of attorney paper to file, a mistake that
does not often arise in completely unrelated portfolios.
91 RPX Corp., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Sep. 16, 2011).
92 In other words, if I am a company and I am worried about a troublesome patent that could be used against me, RPX can
buy the patent and transfer the patent to a troll reserving a license for all RPX investors. The troll is then free to go after non-RPX
investors, presumably their competitors. According to RPX, “in nearly a third of our transactions, we acquire rights only for our
clients, and we have already begun to sell patents. Those joining later may not get the full benefit of licensing to our broad
portfolio that our earlier clients enjoy.” FAQs, RPX CORP., http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=23 (last visited Nov. 15,
2011).
93 See Order No. 40, Initial Determination Granting Joint Motion to Terminate Investigation as to Respondent Performance
Designed Products LLC, 2011 WL 4438273 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 2011) (Inv. No. 337-TA-773) (Appendix A contains a
redacted version of a template RPX license, and the language above is found in Section 2.1(c).); Order No. 11, Initial
Determination Granting Joint Motion to Terminate Investigation as to Vivitek, 2011 WL 2677777 (U.S. Inter’l Trade Comm’n,
2011) (Inv. No. 337-TA-773) (Appendix A contains another redacted version of a template RPX license, and the language above is
also found in Section 2.1(c)).
94 After hearing the definition of “privateer,” Desmarais conceded that he was one, adding, “I’ve been called worse things.”
John Desmarais, Round Rock Research, Comment made during the privateering portion of a panel discussion entitled “The
Developing NPE Market” at the Intellectual Property Business Congress in San Francisco (June 20, 2011). Just prior to this
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Micron has not made a formal filing with the SEC regarding the large patent sale to Round Rock
or issued a press release about it. Curiously, Micron’s annual disclosures to the SEC from 2007-2010
report a consistent figure for the number of patents held by the company and show no drop in the
number of patents owned. Nevertheless, in litigation filings, Round Rock says that it has no parent
company and that no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. This has raised
questions as to who owns Round Rock and/or who financed the sale.95
Desmarais is the only public face for Round Rock.96 One could estimate that the value of 3,400
Micron patents probably approaches or exceeds a hefty fraction of $1 billion,97 which is seemingly a
larger sum than even a successful patent litigator would likely be able to muster from his own
resources.
Suggesting a connection between Round Rock and Intellectual Ventures would be speculation,
but we do note an interesting number of intersections between the people involved in each entity.
For example, Desmarais is the litigator for the patent infringement lawsuit that Intellectual Ventures
has filed against the field programmable gate array manufacturers. He is also the litigator for one of
the Pragmatus cases filed using patents formerly owned by Intellectual Ventures, as well as the
litigator for Oasis Research, a possible Intellectual Ventures privateering operation. Melissa
Finocchio, Intellectual Ventures’ chief litigation counsel, was formerly the head of the litigation
department at Micron. In addition, Samsung has reportedly signed separate licensing agreements in
2010 with Round Rock, Micron Technology, and Intellectual Ventures.98
II. POTENTIAL POSITIVE EFFECTS

¶89

We will begin by examining the potential positive effects that mass aggregators could bring.
What opportunities are presented or failures are remedied by their appearance in the market? What
positive implications do these effects have for innovation or for individual players in the world of
invention?
A. The Forgotten Inventor

¶90

¶91

In a perfect world, there might be no role for mass aggregators. An inventor, incentivized by the
rewards available through the patent system, creates an invention bringing forth the idea for all to see
and benefit from. The inventor either manufactures a product resulting from the invention or
licenses the invention to others for manufacture. Those who want to enter a particular commercial
space, thoroughly scour the record of patents granted to determine whether they must obtain rights
from any patent holders. If rights are needed, the parties willingly negotiate a license and the product
goes forward. At the end of the day, inventors are rewarded for the innovations they bring to the
field, and society benefits from the introduction of new products and ideas.
The patent system, however, is far from perfect, and the pathway from invention to patent to
product is unlikely to be so simple, direct, or focused on patent law. Ideas and information can
permeate intellectual exchanges, particularly in fields where academic research plays an important
comment, Desmarais and the other attendees had heard a discussion of privateering that included a Powerpoint slide that defined
“privateering” as “The assertion of IPRs by an entity (the privateer), typically in the form of an NPE, against a target company for
the direct benefit of the privateer and the consequential benefit of a sponsor company, where the consequential benefits exceed the
direct benefits.”
95 See, e.g., Round Rock Research v. HTC Corp., No. 1:10-CV-00840-UNA (D. Del. filed Oct. 10, 2010).
96 Desmarais, supra note 94.
97 The Nortel patent auction was completed on July 1, 2011 for $4.5 billion and comprised a comparable number of patents
albeit in a different technical subject. Nortel Networks Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 1, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72911/000119312511179790/d8k.htm.
98 Round Rock is to some extent the successor to Keystone Technology Solutions, LLC. Keystone was closely tethered to
Micron and may well have been wholly owned by Micron. Many of Round Rock’s patent assets began as Micron properties, were
transferred to Keystone, transferred back to Micron, and then transferred to Round Rock. Keystone does not appear to have had
any employees who were not also Micron employees.
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role. Such ideas may skip lightly along a discussion pipeline, moving around unmoored from their
intellectual property tethers. Producers may incorporate ideas unconsciously, failing to recognize that
the inspiration or credit belongs to someone else. In another scenario, a producer develops the idea
through independent creation often completely unaware that someone else was technically “first”
with the idea but maybe not with the product. Numerous researchers and inventors may be working
on similar issues at the same time, as they try to push through the barriers at the edge of a field. A
great invention may fail (initially) as a commercial product because other, unrelated but nevertheless
enabling technologies, are themselves too immature to support a successful commercial product.
Later, when the enabling technologies mature, the later innovators may be completely unaware that
someone else pioneered similar products but failed commercially.99
In theory, the producer should be able to search for relevant patents and arrange necessary
licensing, but in the real world, this description is no more than a convenient myth. Many patent
attorneys actively counsel their clients not to look at issued patents for fear of their client being put
on notice, which risks the beginnings of a damage calculation plus the possibility of additional
damages due to willfulness;100 many corporations have adopted similar firm-wide directives. Limited
resources at the Patent and Trademark Office sometimes thwart patent examiners from screening
out bad patents and weak claims. With roughly 2 million active US patents,101 identifying all
potentially relevant patents is tremendously challenging. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
know in advance how broadly a patent will be interpreted and whether a particular patent claim will
be upheld.102 Much of this uncertainty stems from the fact that the metes and bounds of the patent,
when enforced, are determined by the court through the process of claim construction, a process that
is notoriously unpredictable.103 In a classic example of the problem, two recent litigations happening
at the same time within the same district court produced different constructions of the same claim
term.104
Even when a producer has diligently acquired all the licenses that appear to be needed, a new
party may appear. In a problem known as patent stacking, producers find themselves paying out
ever-greater amounts of their revenue to a theoretically unlimited number of patent holders. There is
no law, rule, or guideline that necessarily limits the aggregate number of intellectual property licenses
for a product to a fixed percentage of revenue, and it is theoretically possible for the collective
amount of royalties to exceed 100% of revenue.105
In short, the patent system works just fine for generating patents but stumbles in rights
licensing.106 Some producers take licenses from aggressive licensors whose patents may not be

One example of this phenomenon played out in NTP v. RIM, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”).
101 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, there were 1,930,631 active patents in the United States in
2009. Statistics on Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
102 John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan
Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 324-25 (2008); Amber H. Rovner, Canons of Patent Claim Construction, 873 PLI/PAT 85, 130
(2006) (“If one thing is certain . . . it is that claim construction is inherently uncertain.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); ROBIN
FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT RIGHTS (forthcoming 2012).
103 For commentary on the uncertainty of claim construction, and thereby claim scope, see, e.g., Gretchen A. Bender,
Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
175, 203-07 (2001) (noting that the Federal Circuit changed lower courts’ claim interpretations in about 40% of cases between 1996
and 2001, which indicates a large degree of uncertainty for inventors and practitioners); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform
and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 33-35 (2007) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s failure to adopt a consistent
methodology for claim construction has created “significant doctrinal instability and confusion in the lower courts”); R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L . REV. 1105,
1161-63 (2004) (analyzing the Federal Circuit’s decisions involving claim interpretation from 1996 to 2002 and finding a pattern of
panel-dependent outcomes, as well as variability in the choice of methods used in claim construction by individual judges). See also
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008) (offering
that, due to the formalist structure of patent law, all claims are infinite in scope).
104 See Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
105 Eleven patent holders each entitled to 10% of gross revenue would amount to 110% of revenue.
106 And may stumble even further in fulfilling its ultimate raison d’etre in society.
99

100
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infringed while other producers play games to avoid licensing rights from parties whose patents
probably are infringed. It’s a hard knock life for the small inventor and the forthright producer.107
Even when the proper parties do identify each other, information gaps, valuation difficulties, and
other transaction obstacles may prevent consummation of a deal. Plagued by boundless uncertainty,
insufficient information, and high transaction costs, the true patent system looks nothing like the
idealized version.108 Imagine a real property market where almost no comparable information is
available. The sales price for the house next door is unavailable as is the sale price for the house two
blocks away with an identical floor plan.109
In this world of imperfections, mass aggregators may provide a market mechanism for the
forgotten inventor whose innovations are in use every day but who remains uncompensated. By
creating a market for monetization of patents, mass aggregators might make it possible for individual
inventors to find others who have the capital and expertise to identify and pursue claims against
those who are producing products that infringe.
Compensating existing inventors does not increase the store of available products or necessarily
fund further innovation. One could argue, nevertheless, that a market for patent monetization
benefits innovation beyond simply providing cash for the patent holder. Inventors as a whole may be
more likely to bring forth new inventions if the mechanisms for reward operate more effectively than
the roulette wheel that inventors face today.110
B. The Middleman

¶98

¶99

¶100

In addition to the possibility of compensating forgotten inventors, one could argue that mass
aggregators serve as a form of efficient middle man, a market intermediary who helps patents find
their way to those who would exploit them to create new products. Inventors may not have the
capital, expertise, or other necessary capacity to manufacture products. One could see the market for
patent monetization as a matching system moving patents to those with proper production capacity.
Middleman systems do have some precedence in the world of innovation finance. Venture
Capitalists have been known to set up incubators to help those with ideas bring them to fruition. The
market for patent monetization could be another variant on the theme. One possibly stark difference,
however, is that the patent aggregators work purely with patent legal rights and not with technology
licenses. Similarly, they do not tend to push the direction of new creations but instead scoop up
creations in areas of interest to them, which tend to be the “hot” technology areas of today and not
the beneficial technologies of tomorrow. In short, there does not seem to be a technology aggregator
who works to facilitate the spread of otherwise unknown information and know-how as opposed to
spreading legal rights whose boundaries are set forth on publicly available websites and patent
libraries.
As described above, Intellectual Ventures, if not the other mass aggregators, does have a
laboratory set up like an incubator.111 The problem with the notion of mass aggregators as middle
men connecting innovators with production capital and capacity, is that for the most part, they do
not seem operate that way. Very little mass aggregator activity appears to be of the middleman
variety. Most activity seems to be focused on the interaction of existing patents with existing
products. In short, the mass aggregators are not “technology push” in the sense of directing the
CHARLES STROUSE & MARTIN CHARNIN, It’s a Hard Knock Life, on ANNIE (1977).
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005); Joshua S. Gans, David
H. H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54
MGMT. SCI. 986-89 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/searle/papers/Stern.pdf; Anne Kelley,
Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 130 (2011).
109 See, e.g., Nathan Myhrvold & Mark Lemley, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007).
110 We will discuss the 26-year “time lag” of patent exploitation and “To Serve Man” below.
111 The lab, however, is a mere 27,500 square feet and tends to do little more than contract applied research in anti-malarial
devices for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Our Inventions, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/OurInventions.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
107
108
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spark of creation for tomorrow’s new products. Rather, their activities follow the pattern of scanning
the horizon to pick out today’s hot technology areas and then finding and securing orphaned and
non-aligned patents that can be used to extract a return from today’s products.
In theory, a market for patent monetization could operate as a type of exchange, where buyers
and sellers can meet with lower transaction costs. Exchange markets, however, do invite arbitration
and speculation, which does not always have a stabilizing economic influence. The speculative effects
are multiplied by the extreme information asymmetries in the intellectual property rights markets in
which some parties have access to extensive market information and other parties have little more
than a gut feel. For this and other reasons, exchange systems tend to have a fairly extensive degree of
regulation and supervision.
C. The Litigation Defense Fund

¶102

¶103

¶104

¶105

The most likely positive role for mass aggregators may be as a Litigation Defense Fund. The
patent world is characterized by extensive bargaining.112 Of particular relevance to the aggregator
scenario, a company faced with an infringement claim may look at its own portfolio to see what
patents can be asserted against the entity that is threatening them. In other words, suppose you sue
me for patent infringement. If I have an extensive patent portfolio and can threaten to assert them
against your products, you may be more willing to settle your infringement claim against me, or we
may be able to work out a cross-licensing arrangement. I am much more vulnerable to infringement
suits, both ones that are strong and ones that are weak, if I do not have appropriate patents to
bargain with.
Wouldn’t it be nice if one could find precisely the patent one needs at just the right moment?
Mass aggregators seem to be organized to provide exactly that service. Recall for example, the
Verizon scenario described above, in which Verizon purchased patents from the Intellectual
Ventures portfolio to assert against TiVo as a counterclaim in TiVo’s infringement litigation against
Verizon.113 This is reminiscent of the Just-In-Time inventory strategy, in which materials are
purchased and products are made only as they are actually needed to meet customer orders.114
One can think of mass aggregators as allowing Just-In-Time patenting. When a company is sued
for infringement or must enter into a negotiation to acquire rights from another entity, the company
can shop for and acquire precisely the patents that could present a counter threat to the opposing
party. When the litigation is complete, the patent can be returned. This type of strategy could ensure
that a company has the comfortable freedom to operate vis-à-vis its competitors without worrying
about patent suits that are the scourge of the modern patent world.115
In addition to the Verizon example, several other companies have successfully used this tactic to
mitigate lawsuits brought against them.116 Hewlett Packard, for example, filed an infringement suit
against Acer in March 2007.117 Acer, a Taiwanese company, subsequently bought several patents
from a Taiwanese research organization,118 and then asserted the patents in a countersuit against
HP.119 The lawsuit was settled by mid-2008.120
112 FELDMAN, supra note 102 (arguing that patents do not grant clear, definitive rights but rather serve as the beginning of the
bargaining over the contours of those rights).
113 See discussion at text accompanying supra note 46.
114 Just in Time (JIT) Manufacturing and Inventory Control System, ACCOUNTING FOR MANAGEMENT,
http://www.accountingformanagement.com/just_in_time.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
115 Renting patents will do little to discourage lawsuits by non-practicing entities, however.
116 These examples are discussed in Ewing, supra note 68.
117 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acer, Inc., No. 02-07-CV-103-CE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25952, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008).
118 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number”
for “5977626”, “6188132”, “6788257”, “6280021”) (showing execution dates to Acer in September and July of 2007); What is
ITRI?, INDUS. TECH. RESEARCH INST., http://www.itri.org.tw/eng/about/article.asp?RootNodeId=010&NodeId=0101 (last
visited Dec. 5, 2011).
119 Erica Ogg, Acer Sues HP Again Over Patents, CNET NEWS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2007, 3:40 PM PDT),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9808687-7.html.
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Similarly, Samsung defended itself in a patent infringement case by buying patents and then using
them in a countersuit against Matsushita.121 Over the course of the litigation, Samsung also filed
counterclaims related to patents that it had previously obtained from a German government
agency.122
It would be difficult to overestimate the value of having an effective response to the problem of
modern patent litigation. It is tremendously challenging, if not impossible, to determine whether an
asserted patent is valid and whether it applies to the product it is being asserted against. Patent
litigation is lengthy and expensive, and it is tough to predict the outcome of any individual case.
When a company is sued for infringement, the rational choice may be to pay the person bringing the
claim, even if the claim is quite weak. If a settlement cannot be reached, a company must slog
through years of exhausting litigation that can drain the company’s finances, distract the company’s
executives, and generate negative publicity. The ability to acquire the perfect weapon, tailored to a
particular patent litigation, just at the time it is needed would be of great value to modern companies.
Mass aggregators may offer a secondary function that can also help with litigation woes. Just-inTime patenting will not necessarily help in fending off trolls. Trolls, by definition, are non-practicing
entities. Thus, trolls do not have any products that might be vulnerable to threats from other patents.
There may be complicated strategies, in which patents can be used through third parties to interfere
with a particular troll’s activities, but in general, Just-in-Time patenting is not a troll solution.
Mass aggregators, however, can impede activities by non-practicing entities in other ways. Large
patent pools with vast capital resources can deal with trolls by sopping up their potential patent
inventory when it appears on the market. In other words, an aggregator on behalf of its subscriber
operating companies may compete with trolls by buying up patents that could possibly used against
any of them if they appear in an open market. The companies still incur costs to respond to the troll
problem, but it may be cheaper to buy patents then to buy off trolls, and it is certainly less distracting
and aggravating for company executives. In addition, the anti-troll patent acquisition activity is
outsourced to a third party—the mass aggregator—who may gain experience as a repeat player in the
market for patent monetization, allowing the company to focus on its core activity of production.123
Similarly, the aggregator may approach a non-practicing entity that has already sued or
threatened to sue members of the aggregator’s anti-troll club and simply buy the patent and or secure
licenses. This process may provide settlement for the operating company members at lower cost than
they would spend litigating (and settling) individual lawsuits, although one could question whether it
constitutes horizontal collusion by competitors.
This process may also be good for the aggregator’s business. When the non-practicing entity has
also sued companies who are not members of the aggregator, the aggregator may also purchase
additional licenses or make other arrangements with the non-practicing entity that make “joining the
club” attractive for the non-member operating companies. Of course, this process does not really
break the non-practicing entity’s business model, and in some sense provides it with greater certainty
of an ultimate deal, albeit possibly at a lower profit.124
120 Press Release, Hewlett Packard, HP and Acer Settle Patent Litigation (June 8, 2008), available at
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2008/080608a.html.
121 Brief of Plaintiff at 5, Matushita v. Samsung, No. 02-336, 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 32374 (D.N.J. 2005); Eric
Hellweg,
SonicBlue’s
Bankruptcy:
Big
Media
Wins,
CNN
MONEY
(Mar.
27,
2003),
http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/27/technology/techinvestor/hellweg/index.htm; USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB,
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “5481693”) (showing transfer of the ‘693
patent to Samsung from SonicBlue on Nov. 14, 2002).
122 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number”
for “5181209”) (purchased from the German aerospace research center now known as Deutsches Zentrum für Luft-Und
Raumfahrt E.V.).
123 One philosophical conundrum with this strategy, however, is whether the mass aggregator expressly abandons the
purchased patents, thus eliminating them forever as a threat to anyone, or whether the mass aggregator subsequently solves the
“free rider” problem by “trolling” against non-aggregator subscribers using the purchased patents. In the first approach, the
aggregator performs a community service at the expense of its subscribers and financial backers; in the second approach, the
aggregator essentially becomes a troll itself.
124 This may encourage the non-practicing entity to enter a “volume business” on a lower revenue per unit transacted basis,
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This particular anti-troll approach also has a pleasant side effect. As the aggregator amasses
patents, those patents can be used as a hammer to bash competitors who haven’t joined the club, and
the income can be used to defray the costs of acquisition.
Intellectual Ventures has taken a particularly forward-looking approach to the activity. By signing
up universities, research labs, and inventors, Intellectual Ventures has optioned future patentable
ideas prior to their conception. In other words, they are not just swatting the pesky mosquitos; they
are actually draining the swamp. Of course, this analogy assumes that “the swamp,” also known as a
“biologically diverse wetland,” is a bad thing that all parties agree should be drained, filled in, paved
over, and forgotten.
The value of this litigation defense and anti-troll activity may explain why some of the largest
market incumbent technology companies are listed as early investors and participants in mass
aggregators. These companies may find the possibility of a defense fund tantalizingly appealing, even
if they would be more reluctant to join troll-like activity. In addition, the pressure of joining a mass
aggregator becomes greater across time. As your fellow technology companies sign up, it becomes
harder to resist, even if it falls outside of corporate policies or the goals to which one might
otherwise aspire. Business is a form of communication, and market actors tend to replicate the
behavior of others.
If the model works well enough, it could become more than Just-In-Time patenting. Over time,
a company may not have to do much more than rattle the defensive sword against a competitor. The
largest market incumbents presumably have the greatest potential access to the Just-in-Time patents.
When one has an insurmountable weapon, there is no need to use the weapon.125 In this context, as
companies demonstrate that they have access to any sort of patent for use against any sort of
company via access to a pool, the amount of producer v. producer patent litigation could potentially
be reduced as prospective litigants contemplate the potential impact of a new, unknown weapon that
the well-heeled market incumbent could assert against them by virtue of its platinum club card. Thus,
participating in a patent mass aggregator becomes a form of insurance. One may never need it, but it
is there if necessary. Like any doomsday device, however, it needs to be advertised and concretized
with strategic demonstrations of its potential power.126
Finally, in thinking about the troll activity that mass aggregators could potentially counter, one
must be careful that the cure is not worse than the disease. As patent scholars Meurer and Bessen
point out in their book, troll activity accounts for only a small part of the costs of the patent
system.127 If the potential harms from this anti-troll approach are too great, the solution could be
worse than the problem. We will turn to considering the potential harms from mass aggregation
activity.
III. POTENTIAL HARMS

¶117

If the patent system worked efficiently, one might be able to anticipate and measure the types of
positive effects described above. The patent world, however, is far from perfect. In fact the same
market imperfections that fuel the trolling phenomenon are likely to prevent the market for patent
monetization from offering the positive effects contemplated and to create harm instead. The aspects
of the patent system that ensure high transaction costs, encourage nuisance litigation, and create
e.g., mass production.
125 But then again, maybe not. In the period immediately following the Second World War, the US government assumed that
it could fight all future wars using nuclear weapons and consequently wouldn’t need nearly as many soldiers, sailors, and marines.
The armed services competed fiercely over control of nuclear weapons because the government was considering eliminating at
least one of them. But when the Korean War came along, the strategists soon realized that some wars would be fought on scales
that would not justify the use of nuclear weapons, and consequently, conventional weapons became much more attractive again
and each of the separate services thrived.
126 See, e.g., DR. STRANGELOVE, OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures
1964). The problem with the Soviet “doomsday device” was that they had not told the Americans they had developed it.
127 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 160 (2008).
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incentives for inefficient behaviors will carry over to the new patent system with the addition of
aggregators.
The overarching problem is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to get a quick and inexpensive
answer in a patent dispute. Given the difficulty of translating the abstract language of a patent from
one context to another, the lack of predictability in patent decisions, and other uncertainties in patent
law, it is difficult to tell whether a particular patent claim will be upheld and whether a particular
product will be found to infringe a given claim.128 No matter what the trial court decides, litigants
have fairly good chances that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may find differently. The
cost of finding an answer to the question is quite high in terms of both dollars and time. Patent
litigation is lengthy and expensive, so the cost of testing whether a particular threat of infringement
has merit will be high. The cost is so high, in fact, that testing a threat can easily exceed the cost of
settlement, and parties may rationally choose to pay a complainant even when the claims seem quite
weak.
In calculating the potential costs of litigating an infringement claim, a company must also include
the risk that damages will be assessed. Current doctrines on measuring damages from patent
infringement can result in awards that have a devastating impact on a company. Suppose a company
makes a complicated, multi-component product. If one component of the company’s product is
found to infringe someone else’s patent, the damages may far exceed the value of that component to
the overall product.129 The greatest risk from an infringement suit, however, is that the company’s
product will be simply shut down. Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that patent holders are
not automatically entitled to an injunction after proving that someone is infringing the patent,
injunctions are still frequently granted.130 Having to shut down the entire product could be
devastating, even if the product could eventually be reconfigured to avoid infringing. In short, the
problem is not just the high costs of getting an answer but also the risks associated with getting an
adverse answer. These are not bets that the typical commercial actor wants to accept, and who may
therefore want to make the problem go away by settlement.
Such tremendously high transaction costs have the effect of incentivizing suboptimal behavior
from all actors. For example, patent holders have an incentive to assert marginal patents in the hopes
of getting the company to settle for an amount less than it would cost the company to litigate. With
insufficient validity and valuation information, some patent holders asserting valid patents that are
being infringed may seek damages far in excess of the patent’s value. Conversely, operating
companies have an incentive to utilize the power that comes from their ability to employ better legal
counsel in these complex interactions, even when the operating companies suspect that they are
infringing a valid patent.
Even perfectly honest and diligent operating companies are caught in the maelstrom. With the
millions of active patents on record, each of which may have dozens or even hundreds of claims,
combined with the difficulty of knowing how they will be interpreted, it is impossible to know with
certainty that one’s product will not infringe someone else’s patent claims. In this environment,
lawyers may encourage company executives not to search, to avoid the greater damages available
from willful infringement. In a similar vein, patent counsel will instruct inventors not to search
extensively for prior art, because a patent applicant need only disclose prior art that the applicant
knows about.
In short, the patent system is plagued by a vast supply of patents, many of which may be quite
weak. The present system for granting patents does not overtly consider the overall patent supply in
128

102.

For a discussion of the uncertainty of language and other uncertainties inherent in patent law, see FELDMAN, supra note

129 Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 664 (2009); Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2003 (2007); FELDMAN, supra note 102.
130 eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies
Restructured, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 798 (2009) (stating that injunctions are still granted in 72% of
cases after eBay v. MercExchange).
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a given technical area in granting new patents.131 In addition, regardless of whether the patent is weak
or strong, the range of each patent cannot be determined without a large investment of time and
effort, and any pre-litigation predictions about the scope of a patent may prove incredibly wrong.
Mass aggregation will not alter the high transaction costs of obtaining an answer within the
system, the vast supply of patents, or the incentive structures of the parties involved. These
characteristics will persist regardless of whether the patent holder is an original inventor, a traditional
troll, or a mass aggregator.
One can think of mass aggregation as the patent system on speed.132 More bargaining and
swordplay will take place among a company producing products, its competitors, and non-practicing
patent holders, but some of the parties involved in this gamesmanship will be larger and have more
sophisticated weaponry. Trolling activity will occur, but it will be carried out more often and by larger
trolling entities. Without changing the basic incentive structures of the patent system, mass
aggregation will be no better than the current patent system at rewarding the deserving inventor and
greasing the wheels of innovation while protecting diligent producing companies. One could even
argue that the mass aggregation activities will act as a multiplier for the worst aspects of the present
system—deserving but low capitalized patentees will be further marginalized while product
companies are forced to license greater numbers of marginal patents.
If mass aggregation were merely no better than the current system, one might not be too
concerned over about its appearance. Unfortunately however, while mass aggregators are likely to
create harms to innovation as a whole.
A. A Tax on Production

¶126

¶127

¶128

¶129

In our vastly imperfect patent system in which transaction costs are substantial, information is
difficult to obtain and is asymmetrically distributed, and the cost of testing the validity of a patent
may be quite high, mass aggregators will be able to extract value through patents regardless of the
strength of the patents they are asserting. The value ultimately would have to come through
payments from manufacturers of current products, and the process would serve as a tax on current
products.
Such a tax on current production may serve to decrease future production and/or operate as a
cost passed on to consumers. When costs of production increase, potential manufacturers must
factor that cost into the decision of whether to produce. As the price point for rational production
rises, fewer products will cross the threshold at which it is worth introducing the product.
From another perspective, the tax on production also could end up reducing R&D. Although
tracing spending decisions in a single firm is complex, at a very simple level, a company that must
spend more on current production costs will have less to spend on research and development of new
products. Many companies have historically funded their R&D from the same source that pays the
company’s licenses.133
From either perspective, a tax on production is likely to have the effect of reducing genuine
product innovation. Thus, the products and services that are being created with the introduction of
the market for patent monetization may not be ones that society wishes to encourage.

131 The technical distance between issued patent claims in crowded fields may be lessened, leading to patents with narrower
claims, but the Patent Office has yet to declare that it is even “difficult” to obtain a new patent in any given area, and no one has
demonstrated that new patents in crowded areas are impossible to obtain. The patent prosecution system essentially functions as a
bargaining process between the Patent Office and its “customers,” the patent applicants.
132 More than six years ago, at the very beginning of its massive patent acquisitions, Intellectual Ventures was described as “a
troll on steroids.” Lisa Lerer, Going Once, LAW.COM CORPORATE COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2005),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=900005439584.
133 This has led to what is sometimes known as “the two-dollar swing.” For every royalty dollar exchanged between a
company and a competitor, a two-dollar differential is created between them if inbound and outbound licensing fees are tied to
R&D funding.
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B. Opportunities for Anticompetitive Conduct
¶130
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Certain characteristics of the market for patent monetization make it an excellent vehicle for
anticompetitive conduct. The market for patent monetization itself may never be truly competitive.
For example, the market for patent monetization may have first mover advantages. As many scholars
have noted, larger groupings of patents may be more useful than smaller groupings or individual
patents.134 With mass aggregation, early players in the field may become large enough to ensure
success before others enter the market, not because the early players are better at evaluating patents
and choosing good ones, but because of their sheer size combined with tactics used to intimidate.
This phenomenon could create entry barriers such that those who come later will never be able to
compete on even terms.135
Antitrust law established some time ago that being big is not bad, in and of itself. Certain tactics,
however, are troubling when taken by those who have the power to hurt consumer welfare in a
particular market by adversely affecting prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods and services
that are currently or potentially available.136 In other words, big is not bad; it is what you do with your
girth that matters. If entry barriers do exist, early entrants into the mass aggregation game may have
the girth and the tactics that would raise antitrust concerns.
We note, as an initial point, that the extensive ties among the various mass aggregators should
raise questions and concerns about horizontal collusion. The complexity and opaque nature of the
corporate structures make it extremely difficult to track the interactions and connect the dots.
For example, consider the scenario suggested above in which the mass aggregator negotiates a
license from a troublesome troll on behalf of its members. Under certain circumstances, one might
consider this to be an example of horizontal collusion in which competitor producing companies join
together to force a lower price from a supplier.
In the largely unregulated environment of this early market, there do seem to be opportunities
for horizontal interactions that could raise questions about anticompetitive behavior. For example,
one prospective investor in mass aggregators reported interesting interactions between two
aggregators, Acacia and RPX.137 According to the investor, the two entities have a monthly call in
which Acacia describes the producers they are in the process of targeting and the patents they will
assert against the producers. Acacia then names a price for the patents in question, and RPX
purchases the patents if it wishes.
Most likely, the interactions constitute nothing more than innocent, periodic sales discussions.
Under other circumstances, however, the interactions could constitute horizontal collusion. This
emerging market environment is reminiscent of the Wild West, in which the early settlers created and
enforced their own norms, and there was little scrutiny or law enforcement from sovereign entities.
C. Raising Rivals’ Costs138

¶136

The current market for patent monetization offers other opportunities for anticompetitive
behavior. For example, wouldn’t it be nice if you could create a tax on production for your
competitor while keeping your own costs low? The market for patent monetization may be a good
vehicle for that. Characteristics such as entry barriers to keep new entrants out, the inability to
quickly resolve issues of patent validity and application, as well as the extensive bargaining inherent in
See Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 641 (2007).
Patents are unique goods somewhat like fine art. It is for similar reasons that the Getty Museum announced early on that it
would stick to acquisition in certain key areas and would provide grants and subsidies to other museums. Otherwise, the best art
would always be acquired by the Getty given the size of its endowment.
136 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
137 See email from investor on file with authors.
138 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96
YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
134
135
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the patent system provide ample opportunities for using the market for patent monetization to raise
rivals’ costs. A tax on production is even more troubling when administered through a market
concentrated in the hands of a few actors.
Consider the recent lament of Google’s chief legal officer, David Drummond. Google purchased
a smartphone operating system called Android to compete with Apple’s iPhone and smartphone
devices that use Microsoft’s Windows system. As sales of Android increased, Apple and Microsoft
joined a coalition of companies to purchase a set of patents from recently acquired Novell. Apple
and Microsoft then teamed up in a second coalition to purchase a large set of telecommunications
patents at auction from recently bankrupt Nortel Networks. Drummond complained that the group
entered the Nortel auction, sending the bidding far above expected value, in order to prevent Google
from purchasing the patents and to assert those patents against makers of Google’s Android phone
in an effort to raise the cost of the phone.139 As Drummond commented so colorfully, “Microsoft
and Apple have always been at each other’s throats, so when they get in bed together you have to
start wondering what’s going on.”140
The Justice Department, expressing concerns over the competitive effects of the group’s
purchase of the Novell patents, insisted on certain requirements, including that 1) Microsoft sell back
the Novell patents and maintain only a license; and 2) all of the patents acquired must be available for
open source licensing.141 These requirements are cold comfort to Google, which is still subject to
efforts by members of the group to assert the Nortel patents acquired in various ways against makers
of Android phones.142 Apparently as a response to the Nortel auction, Google purchased Motorola
Mobility, a mobile telecom arm of Motorola, for $12.5 billion in August 2011.143 The acquisition
gives Google access to some 17,000 patents owned by Motorola Mobility.144
Concerns about the possibility of raising rivals’ costs are particularly troubling in light of the
privateering behavior that is prominent for most of the mass aggregators. Tom Ewing has described
extensively how privateering through third parties can be used to damage one’s competitors or
advance one’s competitive position through a variety of techniques. These include privateering
activities that bring patent lawsuits aimed at scaring off a competitor’s customers and suppliers;
patent suits timed to lower the stock price before an initial public offering or a merger so that the
potential investor buys the stock for less, and privateering activity in a particular nascent field, which
is designed to distract young management and drive risk capital towards particular companies.145 If
particular mass aggregators accumulate sufficient power, then those who are “in the gang” have a
tremendously powerful club that could be used for anticompetitive activity.

139 See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:37 PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html (describing Microsoft’s effort in demanding $15 in
licensing fees per phone from various Android phone makers) (citing Miyoung Kim, Microsoft Wants Samsung to Pay Smartphone
License: Report, THOMSON REUTERS (July 6, 2011, 6:24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/us-samsung-microsoftidUSTRE7651DB20110706).
140 Id.
141 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, CPTN Holdings LLC and Novell Inc. Change Deal in Order to Address Department of Justice’s Open Source
Concerns, JUSTICE NEWS (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-at-491.html.
142 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 139; Josh Halliday & Charles Arthur, Microsoft Sues Motorola Over Android, GUARDIAN TECH. BLOG
(Oct. 5, 2010, 7:21 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/oct/04/microsoft-motorola-android-patent-lawsuit. Of
major concern is the fact that a large number of the Nortel patents are related to emerging industry standards for fourth-generation
(4G) wireless technology. See, e.g., Jamie Sturgeon, Five Years that Changed Everything, FIN. POST (Aug. 20, 2011, 8:59 AM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/08/20/five-years-that-changed-everything/. Not surprisingly, Google appears to be
purchasing patents en masse themselves, recently acquiring a portfolio of more than 1000 patents from International Business
Machines. See Amir Efrati, Google Buys IBM Patents, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2011, 12:41 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904800304576475663046346104.html.
143
See Press Release, Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility (Aug. 15, 2011), available at
http://investor.google.com/releases/2011/0815.html.
144 Victoria Slind-Flor, Google, Nokia, Easyjet, ‘Snakeman,’ Yahoo!, UMG: Intellectual Property, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2011, 4:01
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-04/google-nokia-easyjet-yahoo-umg-intellectual-property.html.
145 See Ewing, supra note 55.
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Society should be particularly concerned about privateering activity aimed at next-generation
technologies that threaten to unseat an entrenched monopolist.146 If participants in mass aggregators
are well-entrenched monopolists, for example, patent lawsuits could conceivably be used to burden
next-generation technology or soften them up for easier purchase. Imagine if Microsoft had
purchased Sergey Brin and Larry Page’s little search engine long before Google became a competitive
threat.
The purchase of the Novell and Nortel patents has focused attention on activities in the
smartphone sector. In general, however, purchasing patents to assert against a competitor, either
directly or through third-party proxies, in an effort to raise the competitor’s costs is a type of
behavior that can be difficult to detect and even harder to deter. A targeted competitor could try to
assert private antitrust claims or claims of patent misuse.147 Current doctrinal trends in both areas,
however, make these claims difficult to pursue. The Federal Circuit is hostile to claims of patent
misuse and rarely finds such claims to be valid.148 Antitrust claims are even more difficult to
pursue.149 In general, one has a right to petition the government, even if the successful petition would
have an anticompetitive impact, and the definition of government includes a petition to a court. 150
There is an exception in which one can base an antitrust claim on court filings that constitute sham
litigation. This requires a finding that from both an objective and subjective perspective, the claim
filed was a sham.151 Given the uncertainties in patent interpretation, however, it is extremely difficult
to establish that assertion of a patent against a product is a sham, particularly given the high burden
of proof that some courts have required in sham litigation cases. In sum, it is tremendously difficult
to succeed in a private antitrust claim.152
Competition authorities, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and
state antitrust agencies might choose to file antitrust claims. These tend to be slow moving processes,
however, and these agencies would face the same hurdles as private antitrust claimants. By the time
the competition authorities detect the behavior, and the courts understand it enough to make room
in the doctrines, early movers may have reaped their rewards and moved on to other tactics. In short,
the type of tactics available to mass aggregators, given characteristics of patents and the structure of
the market for patent monetization may raise troubling concerns of anticompetitive effects.
D. Other Troubling Market Behavior

¶143

Although details of mass aggregator behaviors are difficult to come by or to confirm, one
fascinating episode involving RPX gives a rare inside view of the types of tactics that mass
aggregators have used. In January of 2011, the owner of a Russian technology company contacted
the FBI to suggest that criminal charges be filed against RPX for allegedly engaging in extortion, mail
See Robin C. Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2079 (1999).
Particular to smartphones, patents that are essential to communication standards have been subject to high antitrust
scrutiny. Members of standards bodies are required to license their patents on Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)
terms. However, due to the massive number of patents held by different members and the effect of cross-licensing on license rates,
it is nearly impossible to find similarly-situated licensees in order to determine whether offered license rates are anti-competitive.
Qualcomm v. Broadcom, 501 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2007), is a singular case finding an antitrust violation because the licensor had blatantly
offered reduced license rates for standard-essential patents to customers.
148 See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003) (arguing the
fundamental limitation of antitrust analysis to evaluate abusive licensing practices). The Federal Circuit most recently re-affirmed
the strict limits of the patent misuse doctrine in Princo Corp. v. ITC. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Recognizing the narrow scope of the doctrine, we have emphasized that the defense of patent misuse is not available to a
presumptive infringer simply because a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may
have anticompetitive effects.”).
149 FELDMAN, supra note 102, ch. 5.
150 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is rooted in the constitutional right to political speech and allows citizens to petition the
government without feat of antitrust liability. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
151 Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (articulating the present standard for
sham litigation).
152 FELDMAN, supra note 102, ch. 5.
146
147
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or wire fraud, and racketeering. The letter, signed by the CEO and Chief Intellectual Property
Counsel of Kaspersky Labs was reproduced on the GameTime IP Blog on May 31, 2011.
The letter described the following allegations. According to Mr. Kaspersky, a non-practicing
entity named IPAT sued his company and 23 other companies for patent infringement. Eventually,
22 of the companies signed confidential settlement agreements and were released from the suit, and
eleven of those became members of RPX.
According to the letter, Kaspersky’s company was approached by RPX as well in an email
explaining that RPX had acquired the patents in the lawsuit and could release Kaspersky from the
suit in exchange for a 3-year membership in RPX at a cost of $160,000 a year. With such a
membership, Kaspersky Labs would be released from the suit and would have the benefit of not
being sued in connection with any of the other RPX patents.
Mr. Kaspersky says that in the three months following the initial contact, he received additional
letters and emails from RPX, noting that other defendants in the suit had joined RPX and been
released, that the deadline for joining would soon expire, and that if Kaspersky were to ever sue
other members of RPX, RPX would make patents from its pool available to that member to defend
or counterclaim against Kapersky. Finally, Mr. Kaspersky received an email from RPX explaining
that even though RPX had pledged not to use its patents offensively, RPX could sell its patents to
third parties to be used against non-RPX members. (In such a scenario, of course, the few holdout
companies would become the only targets.) The message also suggested that companies who did not
contribute financially to the settlement would harm their relationship with industry peers.
As far as we have been able to determine, the FBI has taken no action in response to the
Kaspersky letter. Nevertheless, it is not hard to understand how a foreign entity might interpret this
type of patent interaction as extortion. The episode also highlights the need for better definition of
what is legal and what is not in this arena. For example, when would behavior analogous to what is
described in the Kaspersky letter cross the line into anticompetitive behavior? Could the facts ever be
such that it would constitute an attempt to monopolize a market by organizing a cartel? In asking
that question, what market should we be analyzing, the market for the product covered by the patent,
the market for patents in this product arena, or the market for monetization of patents as a whole?
In addition, when should the legal rules require disclosure of a relationship between parties,
either for conflict of interest rules, corporate disclosures, antitrust, or agency purposes? What would
constitute a sufficient relationship between the parties to require disclosure? For example, if a mass
aggregator’s members include all but one player in a particular arena, and the mass aggregator
transfers the patent to a third party giving the third party the right to sue only those who are not
members of the mass aggregator, is the third party acting as an agent of the aggregator when it sues
the only holdout? These are the types of questions that current law is ill equipped to handle.
E. Odd Characteristics of the Inputs Supplying the Market

¶149

¶150
¶151

In addition to harm from a tax on current production and opportunities for anticompetitive
conduct, the new market for patent monetization has other characteristics that raise the specter of
harm to innovation and innovation industries. Consider first the odd characteristics of the inputs that
are supplying the market for patent monetization.
One can think of mass aggregators as any other type of market producer. Aggregators have a
product to sell, and they must purchase inputs to create the product. In this case, the sole raw
materials are patents and patent applications.
Purchasing patents as raw inputs for something other than a manufactured product differs from
the traditional assumptions about the role of patents in the economy.153 The primary role of patents
as it has developed in the modern economy is to allow an inventor or the inventor’s licensee to have
153 Of course, some historical inventors such as the Wright Brothers were primarily interested in licensing their patents rather
than making products, but such inventors were outliers.
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market space for bringing a new product to market from the invention by excluding others from
making, using, or selling the invention.154 As described above, however, aggregators make almost no
effort themselves to cross the divide from patent to product.
Patents are also created or acquired for defensive purposes. Once a company secures patent
rights to an invention, that company frequently tries to patent possible variants of the invention, to
keep competitors from making a close substitute for the product.155 Patents also flow out of R&D
activity as academic institutions or commercial R&D departments search for innovations, patent
them, and then put them aside, hoping to find a licensee who will develop the product or to turn to
them when the company is ready to pursue new products.
Once inventions have been created and patented, they traditionally change hands for a limited set
of reasons, most of them related to product development. Companies producing a product may
acquire patents or license them to create what is known as “freedom to operate”, that is the ability to
produce a product without concerns of infringement suits.156 Along these lines, patents may also be
acquired to create a robust portfolio so that competitors who might be tempted to file an
infringement claim will be deterred or rebuffed by the number of patents that the company can
threaten in return. Companies also find themselves with a varied patent portfolio through mergers
and acquisitions, which may bring patents that range far from the company’s core products.
Thus, the patents that are now being acquired as inputs for mass aggregators traditionally have
been created and exchanged for other reasons, if at all.157 Whether patented offensively or
defensively, inventions have typically been created and acquired either in hopes of creating a
commercial product or for reasons closely related to a commercial product. These inputs, very few of
which would ever generate revenue, are now being monetized and traded independent of underlying
products.
In the words of the patent system, we are finding a “new use” for these old products as inputs
for the mass aggregator product. The new use, however, is not necessarily a good use, from society’s
perspective, although it might potentially generate huge returns for certain investors and early
adopters.
F. Odd Characteristics of the Aggregator Business

¶156

¶157

Although there are many ways to conceptualize the product that mass aggregators offer, consider
the following perspective: What is the mechanism by which mass aggregators expect to generate
income to share with their investors? Some investors receive the benefit of being able to use the
portfolio as a shield from infringement litigation, but not all investors need this particular benefit.
Investors such as the William & Flora Hewlett Charitable Foundation and the World Bank, for
example, are unlikely to worry much about patent infringement lawsuits. All investors, however, are
promised a share of the profits from the mass aggregator’s core business. That business involves
gaining a return by monetizing patents.
In order to gain a direct return from monetizing patents, the return must be collected from
revenues on existing manufactured products. Someone, someplace has to make something that is at
least sort of like the patented invention. There is simply no other way to make a penny from a
patent.158 In other words, the aggregator’s level of return depends on how successful it is at
154 We note that we are describing the role of patents in the modern economy, rather than the description necessarily
promulgated in judicial decisions.
155 This is called “defensive patenting”, in which patent continuations (procedural revisions of patent applications) are used to
create new claims for different variants. For a discussion of use of defensive patents as bargaining chips in cross-licensing, see
William E. Kovacic, Intellectual Property Policy and Competition Policy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 421 (2011).
156 Analysis of freedom to operate is complicated by the sheer volume of issued patents as well as the possibility of
overlapping rights, termed by Carl Shapiro as a “patent thicket.” See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOCATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, & Scott Stern eds.,
2001).
157 We note that small trolls prototyped the process of altering the uses of patents many years ago.
158 A technology license and/or know how would be a different matter.
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extracting value from existing products or products close to the production pipeline. In a world of
perfect information (especially regarding valuation), low transaction costs, and a smoothly
functioning patent system, one might have fewer concerns about any negative effects on the
innovation system. Aggregators would simply play the role of ensuring that the proper value is
shared with the proper inventor, an activity that might well stimulate future innovation.159
In the real world of patents, however, the picture is quite different. As described above, the
system is not effectively structured to filter out or even retard weak or misapplied patents, and the
costs and risks of litigating an infringement suit may far exceed the costs of paying off a claimant.
Thus, the result of having a market for patent monetization is not simply that the forgotten inventor
triumphs; patents are monetized regardless of whether they are strong or weak.160
To put it bluntly, the successful aggregator is likely the one that frightens the greatest number of
companies in the most terrifying way. In fact, a potentially successful approach might be to use a
large number of patents of questionable value acquired cheaply and mixed in with a handful of
strong ones.161 When the aggregator knocks on the door, manufacturers may capitulate simply
because the aggregator is the biggest, baddest guy on the block.162
This may not be the type of market that society wishes to encourage. At the very least, society
might want to curtail certain behaviors, if not forbid them altogether. How can one do this, however,
without causing even greater harms to the innovation system? How does one water the garden so
that only the beneficial plants grow while the weeds whither?
G. Economic Stability

¶161

¶162

Although the possibilities are more remote, one should also consider the potential negative
effects for the broader economy. Patents are linked to innovation in general, which is likely to affect
all sectors. Thus, the effects of the market for patent monetization could be felt broadly across the
economy.
One reference point could be the dot.com crash of the early 2000s, which had a negative impact
on the economy as a whole.163 The run-up to the dot.com crash featured large amounts of capital
flowing into early stage and speculative technology companies, mostly related to the Internet. Many
of the companies had yet to develop a product or to turn a profit; this was the era of “vaporware,” in
which companies could receive funding, go public, and sell products on little more than the promise
of what they might be able to develop. Everyone agreed that some companies would surely strike it
rich in the Internet game, and investors were willing to bid up prices on shares of entities with little
proven value in the hopes that some of them would prove to be gold. The “irrational exuberance”
that drove investment to a frenzied level eventually burst, creating a recession in the technology
industry with ripple effects across the broader economy.164
159 Although even in a perfect system, one would presumably want to balance the royalties that are going to old technology
(up to 26 years old) as opposed to rewards/royalties going to newer technologies. Most new patents expire 20 years, more or less,
after their filing, but damages can be collected up to six years after infringement has occurred.
160 Indeed, one of the benefits of the aggregator model is that it achieves the scale of the licensing operations of the large
operating companies, such as IBM, where at least a few patents from a portfolio of 30,000 active patents is almost certain to be at
least arguably infringed by any licensing target—and there are few reasons why the prospective licensee should review the 30,000
active patents and develop strategies for arguing invalidity and/or non-infringement—which is precisely the game played by
operating companies when approached by a small portfolio comprising just a few patents.
161 This approach, of course, arguably mimics the approach target for a generation by the large operating companies in
conducting their licensing operations. This is precisely the reason behind legendary licensing procedures such as the ruler metric in
which each side literally measures its stack of patents against the other side’s stack.
162 A process frequently described at IP symposiums as “a value proposition.”
163 Roger Lowenstein thoroughly examines the fervor that led to the crash in ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE
CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND IT’S UNDOING, (Penguin 2004). Discussing the cavalier attitude of analysis and use of the rising
market as a benchmark for investment, Lowenstein offers the following quote from Morgan Stanley’s Mary Meeker: “We have only
one response to the word ‘valuation’ these days: ‘Bull Market.’” Id. at 111.
164 This term, attributed to Alan Greenspan, is now used to describe a heightened state of speculative fervor. See Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996) (transcript available
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Not all of the companies that failed during the technology crash were weaklings. Many of these
companies had good business models, and the myriad of ways in which the Internet could be utilized
offered legitimate opportunities for economic exploitation. Others have successfully resurrected the
business models for certain companies that failed when the technology bubble burst in subsequent
years. Nevertheless, the sector could not absorb all the capital that was being thrown at it
indiscriminately, and this, among other problems, led to the crash.
Although there are certainly differences between the emergence of the market for patent
monetization and the run-up to the 2002 technology crash, the similarities are interesting. Most
patents traditionally have proven to have little value. The promise of a new use for this intangible and
abstract asset is already driving up prices for patents and could conceivably move prices above a
rational level. This is particularly true given the venture capital like returns being promised to some
investors, returns that are difficult to duplicate elsewhere in the current economy. One might
reasonably wonder how much capital can be absorbed into the market for intellectual property rights
over a period of time without the investment activity itself causing a local economic deformation.
Specifically, if prices are driven to an irrationally high level, there could easily be a correction, one
whose trajectory might be as steep as the run-up. With a sector crash, less aggressive aggregators
could fail along with more aggressive ones, and publicly traded aggregators could fail along with the
private ones.
Normally, if some people are foolish enough to bid prices up to an irrational level, society would
be unconcerned when those investments fail. We may care more, however, if the crash is such that it
impacts the economy as a whole or impairs our ability to innovate in an economy largely based on
innovation. By analogy, the government would allow Border’s Books to fail, for example, but would
be more concerned with a threat of extensive bank failures.
Although the chances of a wild patent ride followed by a broad economic crash are remote, the
scenario is worth contemplating, nevertheless. To the extent that patents affect all sectors of the
economy, one should be mindful of potentially destabilizing events.
H. “To Serve Man”165

¶168

Mass aggregator activity may have additional effects that will reduce or delay the benefits of
innovation. In particular, the value proposition put to inventors from 400 universities worldwide and
presumably a comparable number of independent inventors may have been something along the
lines that this process would facilitate the commercial development of their inventions. But there is a
stark difference between just patenting an invention and building a technical prototype, developing
related know how, and creating a market for the invention. To obtain a patent one does not need to
have a working product. Indeed, a genuinely working product could be years away. For example,
Chester Carlson’s patented experiments with dry chemical photocopying machines from 1936 until
he produced the first commercially successful Xerox machine in the early 1950s. His experience
provides a cautionary example of the difference between a patent and working product.166 Funding
an aggregator at best funds the Chester Carlsons of the world in 1936 and not the Haloid Xerox
Company of the 1950s. Chester Carlson’s work on developing a photocopier would have likely
stopped once an aggregator had purchased his first few patents.167 The aggregator would then wait
for someone else to take up the ideas later—maybe as much as 26 years later—and then request
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm).
165 DAMON KNIGHT, TO SERVE MAN (1950). The short story was immortalized as a Twilight Zone episode in 1962. To Serve
Man (The Twilight Zone), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_Serve_Man_(The_Twilight_Zone) (last visited Dec. 5,
2011).
166 Carlson’s first patent, US Patent No. 2,221,776, claimed priority from an application filed in 1937. This initial patent was
followed up by some 40 other patentable inventions over nearly a 35-year period by Carlson alone—apart from the additional
inventive contributions made by Xerox employees working to elaborate Carlson’s initial inventive vision.
167 And even if Carlson’s work continued, it would likely lack the practical groundings that come from placing products in the
stream of commerce and then observing how to make them faster, cheaper, and better.
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royalties. If Chester Carlson turned out to be the truly lone pioneer, then a practical photocopier
would never have been produced, at least not on any sort of speedy timeframe.
The situation of dropped inventions has already happened before. The fax machine, which was
all the rage in the ‘80s and ‘90s was invented in 1881 but then largely dropped with the exception of
improvements for the transmission of photographs by news agencies.168 Even if a Chester Carlson
sells his first patent to an aggregator and continues working, his further work will not be guided by
the real world fits and starts associated with making an early prototype and early commercial activity
but will much more likely comprise a series of blue sky thought experiments disconnected from the
real world. In short, the later patents will almost certainly be of lower value in this scenario because
they build only on the shoulders of the first patent and not real experiences.169
It is possible, of course, that buying up all the early Chester Carlson patents will encourage more
Chester Carlson’s. For this to happen, however, Chester Carlson and many folks like him will have to
believe that he got a good deal in selling his patents to the mass aggregator. While he might
appreciate the cash that he was paid for the patents, Chester like many inventors, probably wants to
see his technology developed. Society’s interests would parallel Chester’s in this regard. Innovations
that are delayed or never produced can create little benefit for society as a whole, although such
delays may possibly benefit incumbent producers since they can extend the lifetimes for what would
otherwise be obsolete products. The imperfections of the patent system suggest that many of these
patents would not have made it to market. Some percentage of those, however, would have stayed in
someone’s drawer and had little effect on the innovation system at all, other than complicating patent
searches. With mass aggregators, the products go into the drawer and the patents are used against
current producers who might otherwise have continued on their way unimpeded.
If the inventors who have sold to a modern mass aggregator had aspirations that the aggregator
would facilitate the commercial exploitation of their inventions, they are likely to be sadly mistaken.
The largest of the mass aggregators, Intellectual Ventures, has reportedly built only one prototype
from all the inventions that it has purchased, and this one prototype was for an improved nuclear
reactor that was co-invented by the company’s founder Nathan Myhrvold.170
Thus, while aggregators may defend their activities on the grounds that they are promoting
innovation and the great rewards that society will receive through new products, the reality may be
that many fewer inventions ever become products and many more will be placed on a greatly
extended trajectory. For inventors who hope that that mass aggregators will turn their patents into
real products and the world will finally appreciate their innovations, the scenario is somewhat
reminiscent of an old Twilight zone episode entitled, “To Serve Man.” In the episode, friendly aliens
arrive and offer humanity a panacea from all the woes that beset it. The aliens even take some lucky
humans back to their home planet who are so happy that they never return. Only later does humanity
discover that the aliens’ book “To Serve Man” is not a gospel of benevolent duty, but a cookbook.
I. Ancillary Implications

¶173

In addition to the economic concerns raised above, the accumulation of power may be troubling
in light of the potential for mischief in ancillary avenues. For example, in March of 2011, a company
called Mission Abstract Data LLC sued more than 100 radio industry defendants from different parts
168 US Patent No. 2,292,387 to Hedy Lamarr and George Antheil, which reported the invention of spread spectrum
communication and frequency hopping, had nearly expired as a patent before the US Navy began preliminary work in developing a
prototype. Lamarr and Antheil never sought to create a company around their invention, and the inaction resembled that of a
patent aggregator. This communications technique underlies all modern communications techniques, however. For full story, see
FELDMAN, supra note 102.
169 Carlson’s story is not all that different from other disruptive innovators, including but not limited to television pioneer
Philo Farnsworth and the Wright Brothers.
170 TerraPower “was formed from an effort initiated in 2007 by Nathan Myhrvold’s company Intellectual Ventures.” Who We
Are, TERRAPOWER, http://www.terrapower.com/WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). TerraPower has raised $35 million.
Matthew L. Wald, Developer of Novel Reactor Wins $35 Million Infusion, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/business/energy-environment/15nuke.html. Compared to the $5 billion Intellectual
Ventures has ready to invest, TerraPower’s $35 million is less than 1% of Intellectual Ventures’ total funding.
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of the country for patent infringement.171 Intellectual Ventures previously owned the underlying
patents, and the pathway from Intellectual Ventures to Mission Abstract Data’s present owner
Digimedia Holdings LLC is unclear. Similarly, the New York Times Company filed a declaratory
judgment action172 against Webvention, LLC, which obtained its patents by merger with Intellectual
Ventures’ Ferrara Ethereal LLC in Nov. 2009.173 The New York Times lawsuit ended in less than a
month after the Times obtained a covenant not to sue from Webvention on undisclosed terms.174
Another set of patents formerly owned by an Intellectual Ventures shell company, and now owned
by Patent Harbor LLC, have been used in infringement lawsuits brought against 39 entertainment
companies, including DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc.175 In a draft of our article posted on an
academic works-in-progress website in September of 2011, we noted ironically that Myhrvold is a
board member of lead defendant DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc.176 Although the timing may be
coincidental, Dreamworks was dismissed from the lawsuit, by a motion filed jointly by plaintiffs and
defendants, shortly after the article was posted.177 The dismissal serves as a reminder that it is good to
have friends in high places.
Most of these litigations are in early stages and very little information is available. The action of
suing a large number of media producers, however, sparked our imagination. We offer the following
scenario as a hypothetical and note that there is no indication of such intent on the part of any of the
companies.
Imagine a mass aggregator that is unhappy with the press coverage it is receiving or would like to
encourage media support for a particular issue. With this in mind, the mass aggregator sues a large
number of players in a particular sector of the media based on patents that the aggregator has
recently acquired. When the parties sit down to negotiate, the mass aggregator notes obliquely that,
“it is so odd to be on opposite sides of the table when we have so many issues of mutual interest.”178
The conversation could then touch lightly on coverage that would portray the mass aggregator in a
better light or political initiatives that the media outlets might be interested in investigating or
supporting. Across time as the parties work together on various issues, the settlement costs seem to
move into a range that is remarkably comfortable for the media stations.179
Players in the patent world are quite adept at oblique conversations. In many circumstances, a
patent holder may wish to demand that a producer pay for a license without taking the risk that the
producer will file a declaratory judgment action to have the patent invalidated. Declaratory Judgment
actions can only be filed if there is a sufficient threat of litigation.180 To avoid crossing the threshold,
171 The case names 116 defendants, although many may be corporately related to each other. See Mission Abstract Data LLC
v. Beasley Broadcasting Group, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00176-LPS, (D. Del. filed Mar. 1, 2011).
172 N.Y. Times Co. v. Webvention Holdings LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00634-GMS (D. Del. filed July 18, 2011).
173 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name”
for “Ferrara Ethereal LLC”).
174 See Notice Of Dismissal Without Prejudice Against Webvention, N.Y. Times Co. v. Webvention Holdings LLC, No. 1:11CV-00634-GMS (D. Del. Aug. 17, 2011).
175 Patent Harbor, LLC v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. 6:2011-CV-00229-LED (E.D. Tex. filed May 9, 2011)
(The complaint was filed on May 9, 2011, and involves two patents formerly owned by Gisel Assets KG, LLC, a company that
appears to be an Intellectual Ventures shell company).
176 Robin Feldman & Thomas Ewing, The Giants Among Us (unpublished manuscript) (Sept. 6, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923449; see also DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1297401/000119312511110112/d8k.htm.
177 See Stipulation By Patent Harbor, LLC, Paramount Home, Entertainment Inc., Dreamworks Animation, SKG, Inc.,
Dreamworks Animation, LLC, and Dreamworks Animation Home, Entertainment, LLC and Stipulation Of Dismissal Of
Dreamworks, Animation, SKG, Inc., Dreamworks Animation, LLC, and Dreamworks Animation Home Entertainment , LLC,
Patent Harbor, LLC v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. 6:2011-CV-00229-LED (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2011).
178 This lawsuit ironically came to light about the same time that National Public Radio, not a party to the lawsuit, produced a
program called “When Patents Attack” that was highly critical of Intellectual Ventures. See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5.
179 One could imagine an alternative scenario in which a new line of business as an “influence peddler.” An aggregator sues X
number of media outlets for patent infringement. As a settlement, the aggregator then seeks some defined measure of editorial
control. Having obtained a slice of editorial control over a huge swath of the media, the aggregator then sells this editorial control
(or slices of it) to the highest bidder.
180 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (requiring “a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment”) (quoting
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patent holders may send correspondence referring to areas of mutual interest or issues that might be
worth pursuing. This has been described as the Dance of the Sugar Plum Letter,181 and the media
scenario above is simply a variation on the theme.
The type of behavior suggested in the media hypothetical would be quite difficult to identify or
to address. The hypothetical is a reminder that massive power can be troubling, not just for its
potential economic effects, but for its potential effects in other dimensions as well.
We note along these lines that since the draft of our article was posted,182 Intellectual Ventures
purportedly has been wining and dining members of the academy. This approach may be familiar to
the company, which appears to have solicited favorable commentary in the past.183
IV. A FEW OBSERVATIONS

¶179

The market for monetized patents, which has been created through patent aggregators, should
be understood as a massive, rapidly growing, and essentially unregulated market. It has grown up
quietly, remaining under the radar as early entrants have garnered power and strength. As with any
market, it should be monitored and regulated, with sovereign entities giving some thought to whether
aspects of the market should be encouraged, tolerated, deterred, or outright forbidden.
A. Regulatory Oversight

¶180

¶181

¶182

Competition authorities, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice,
are in the best position to address the activities of mass aggregators and the market for patent
monetization. Establishing the rules for this market, however, will require a certain amount of
reorientation in the conceptualization of innovation markets.
The most natural FTC/DOJ regulatory structures for analyzing the activities of mass aggregators
are those in the context of licensing and acquisition activity.184 In licensing, the Agencies follow a set
of basic principles that are applied to intellectual property licensing in general. These principles are
that intellectual property is comparable to any other form of property and standard antitrust analysis
applies, that intellectual property is not presumed to create market power, and that intellectual
property licensing is generally procompetitive.185 The Agencies believe that problems arise, however,
when a licensing arrangement harms competition among entities that would have been actual or
likely competitors in the absence of the arrangement.
In analyzing intellectual property licensing agreements, the Agencies consider three basic markets
that can be affected by anticompetitive licensing restrictions: goods markets, technology markets, and
innovation markets. Goods markets, of course, are those related to final or intermediate goods and
their close substitutes. When rights to intellectual property rights are marketed separately from the
products in which they are used, the Agencies use technology markets to analyze competitive

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) .
181 See FELDMAN, supra note 102, ch. 2. Intellectual Ventures use of the phrase “invention gaps” provides an excellent
example of such communications.
182 See Feldman, supra note 177.
183 See Complaint and Jury Demand at 6, Choate v. Intellectual Ventures, LLC, No 1:11-CV-00528-ckk (D.C. Mar. 14, 2011)
(alleging that plaintiff was hired by Intellectual Ventures to generate opposition to changes in patent law by disputing the theory
that the patent system is in crisis due to frivolous litigation; activities included writing article and monograph).
184 Three agency reports are particularly useful for understanding the current agency approach. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter EVOLVING MARKETPLACE]; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED.
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter
MERGER GUIDELINES]; and U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter
ANTITRUST LICENSING].
185 See ANTITRUST LICENSING, supra note 184, at 2.
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effects.186 Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed and its close
substitutes.
Finally, licensing arrangements may have competitive effects on innovation that cannot be
adequately addressed through goods or technology markets. Thus, the Agencies have identified a
third type of market, the innovation market, which is defined as the research and development
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes.187
The Agencies do have particular guidelines for certain types of arrangements that may be
relevant to the activities of mass aggregators, including guidelines on cross-licensing, pooling
arrangements, and grantbacks. Grantbacks are licensing arrangements in which the license holder
agrees to give the patent holder rights to any improvements on the invention.
In the case of pooling, for example, the guidelines note that exclusion from pooling
arrangements can be anticompetitive if a) excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant
market and b) pool participants collectively poses market power in the relevant market.188 Similarly,
grantbacks may be found anticompetitive if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to
engage in research and development.189 One should note, however, that these concerns are analyzed
against a backdrop of the Agencies’ perspective that licensing is generally procompetitive.
In a 2011 report on The Evolving Intellectual Property Marketplace, the Federal Trade
Commission took notice of increasing activity by what it called “patent assertion entities” or “PAEs”
in the information technology industry.190 In particular, the Agency noted the following:
Some argue that PAEs encourage innovation by compensating inventors, but this argument
ignores the fact that invention is only the first step in a long process of innovation. Even if
PAEs arguably encourage invention, they can deter innovation by raising costs and risks
without making a technological contribution.191

¶187

¶188

¶189

The report, however, notes the difficulty in distinguishing patent transactions that harm innovation
from those that promote it, and rather than recommending antitrust action proposes various
improvements in patent notice and remedies.
Although these are important considerations, a full analysis of the impact of mass aggregators
requires identification of a different market. Even when Agencies think about separately marketed
intellectual property rights or innovation markets, those categories are grounded in their relationship
to a particular product market. Moreover, market power is measured in relationship to that product
market.
When patent rights float unmoored from any underlying products on a large-scale, widespread
manner such that they are traded and arbitraged, that activity begins to resemble a market of its own.
This is the market we have been describing as the market for patent monetization. Viewed from this
perspective, an entity could acquire market power in the market for patent monetization without
necessarily holding a monopoly in any individual product markets.192 Considering only product,
technology, and innovation markets could miss a fair amount of worrisome activity.
Another way to think about floating patent rights and anticompetitive effects is the following:
One may not need a monopoly on patents in a particular product market to create negative effects in
that market. Perhaps one simply needs a large enough group of all kinds of patents in combination
with tough tactics or even just a reputation for tough tactics.

186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
See EVOLVING MARKETPLACE, supra note 184, at 8.
Id. at 9.
See the discussion above about Intellectual Ventures and the Ocean Tomo patent auctions, for example.
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Moreover, the Agencies may need to reconsider the general principle that licensing is
procompetitive. In the context of a market for intellectual property rights floating separately from
invention or production, that general principle may be less applicable. One has to take a much harder
look at licensing when it has become such an expansive activity that is separated so far from the
activity of introducing new technologies.
The same types of considerations should be used for reorienting the Agencies’ approach to
acquisition of intellectual property rights. Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires that certain proposed
acquisitions of assets be reported, which is interpreted as including patents. The FTC and DOJ may
conduct a preliminary antitrust evaluation and decide whether to take enforcement action.193
Certain transfers of intellectual property rights and transaction that grant an exclusive license are
analyzed by applying the principles and standards used to analyze mergers.194 Such transactions may
have the effect of removing a participant from the market, in the same manner as a traditional
merger would.195
In any merger enforcement action, the Agencies will normally identify one or more relevant
markets in which the merger may substantially lessen competition. Such market definitions focus
solely on demand substitution factors, which are customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away
from one product to another. Again, the traditional Agency focus in this inquiry would be on the
market for the products that can be made by the patents that are being purchased, but not on the
market for patent monetization itself. Such an inquiry would miss a wealth of potential
anticompetitive conduct and consequences.
In short, competition agencies should think about a market composed of floating intellectual
property rights as its own market, in order to capture the potential for harm and mischief. Courts
also must be willing to understand and approach patent markets in this manner. Although the focus
initially may be on patents in this market, it is possible that over time it will become clear that the
market for all intellectual property rights, including trade secrets and know-how as well as patents,
should be considered.
Courts, agencies and government entities must also engage in doctrinal changes that will allow
for the curative power of sunshine. As we encountered in trying to track the acquisition and litigation
activity of the mass aggregators, many of the current doctrines in corporation and agency law allow
aggregators to shield their identities from government view and from their competitors who may be
subsequently blindsided in litigation. The targets themselves may be unable to determine who the
aggregator is, sometimes even when the parties are in litigation. The less appealing behavior
described above is much easier to carry out in secrecy than in the light of day. We should consider
changes that will bring such activities to light, making them easier to monitor and evaluate their
individual and cumulative effects.
B. Let the Sun Shine In

¶196

¶197

If society wishes to impose regulation on the market for patent monetization, regulators will
need a method of monitoring behavior. One might also wish to make activity transparent to
members of the public, who can be useful for alerting regulators to potential problems. In particular,
where the law anticipates that society’s interests may align with members of the public, lawmakers
may choose to make information publicly available or to provide avenues for members of the public
to advance actions on their own behalf.
Current laws provide limited opportunities for identifying and tracking activity in this market and
many opportunities for hiding. Mass aggregators have sufficient access to capital and legal resources
to take advantage of all opportunities offered and to prepare for a host of contingencies. Among
193 For a description of notice and filing requirements, see Premerger Introductory Guides, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 24,
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/introguides.shtm.
194 ANTITRUST LICENSING, supra note 184, at 31.
195 Such transactions may be assessed under § 7 of the Clayton Act, §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act, and § 5 of the FTC Act.
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other things, the mass aggregators have constructed elaborate corporate networks that narrowly
confine the legal claims that can be brought against them, providing a firewall that protects the larger
organization.
Consider Searete LLC, a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures shell company196 that
exemplifies the complicated ownership and management structures employed by mass aggregators.197
Searete has the type of complex and carefully woven legal structure that would make a defense lawyer
beam with joy. It is a Delaware limited liability company with a presence in Nevada.198 Searete’s
official manager in Nevada is “Nevada Licensing Manager, LLC,” which is a Nevada corporation.199
Nevada Licensing Manager’s own manager is “Nevada Assets, LLC,” which is a Delaware
company.200 At some point, Nevada Assets, LLC presumably connects with Intellectual Ventures,
LLC or one of Intellectual Ventures’ many investment funds. However, the connection might be
little more than the ownership of shares, effectively rendering almost no one responsible for its
actions.
The other 1,300 or more shell companies in Intellectual Ventures’ organization exist in similarly
obscure networks with the “parent” company, structures permitted by the corporate laws in many
states. In short, the ownership and management structures for mass aggregators are often elaborate,
and state corporation laws complicate the process of finding out who actually controls any given
limited liability company.201
The ownership and control picture may not become much clearer even after litigation has begun,
not only for the public but for the litigants as well. Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires all nongovernmental litigants to disclose their parent corporation and any publicly held
corporation owning 10% or more of their stock.202 The rule’s purpose is not to discover litigation
motives and corporate activities, but to assist judges in disqualifying themselves due to conflicts of
interest.203 The rule’s focus on parents and public companies, however, limits its effectiveness in
disclosing the parties ultimately behind patent monetization activity, especially with mass aggregators
that are not public companies.
Individual courts may impose additional disclosure rules that may bring further information to
light. Some jurisdictions use variations of the rule. For example, the Central District of California
employs the variation, known as a “Certification as to Interested Parties,” that requires disclosure of
a much broader range of parties. The variation states:
L.R. 7.1-1 Certification as to Interested Parties.1 To enable the Court to evaluate possible
disqualification or recusal, counsel for all non-governmental parties shall file with their first
appearance an original and two copies of a Notice of Interested Parties which shall list all
persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships and corporations (including parent
corporations clearly identified as such) which may have a pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the case, including any insurance carrier which may be liable in whole or in part (directly
or indirectly) for a judgment that may be entered in the action or for the cost of defense.
Counsel shall be under a continuing obligation to file an amended certification if any
196 John Letzing, Microsoft’s Big Brains Spill Into Patent Firm, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 4, 2009)
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/microsofts-big-brains-spill-over-patent.
197 Intellectual Ventures parks many of its “inventioneering” patent applications in Searete. Id.
198 Delaware Corporations file 3776428 shows that Searete LLC was formed on March 12, 2004. DELAWARE DIVISION OF
CORPORATIONS, https://delecorp.delaware.gov (search “file number” for “3776428”). Nevada Corporations records show that
Searete LLC, Nevada Corporate Id NV20041267664 was registered in Nevada on Nov. 15, 2004. NEVADA BUSINESS ENTITY
SEARCH, http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx (search “NV Business ID” for “NV20041267664”).
199 NEVADA BUSINESS ENTITY SEARCH, http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx (search “NV Business ID” for
“NV20041267664”). Nevada Corporation records show that Nevada Licensing Manager, Nevada Corporate ID NV20041268216
was created on Nov. 15, 2004. Id. (search “NV Business ID” for “NV20041267664”).
200 Delaware Corporations file 3881571 shows that Nevada Assets, LLC was also created on Nov. 15, 2004. DELAWARE
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, https://delecorp.delaware.gov (search “file number” for “3881571”).
201 Nevada, for example, is known for being particularly respectful of such information. Some, but far from all, foreign
corporations laws are also protective of such information while other countries require full disclosure.
202 FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(1).
203 See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE LITIGATION MANUAL 7.1.1 (Matthew Bender, 2010).
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material change occurs in the status of interested parties as, for example, through merger or
acquisition, or change in carrier which may be liable for any part of a judgment.204
¶202

Some other courts use a similarly worded variation requiring that at a first appearance in any
proceeding with the court, the party must file a “Certification of Interested Entities or Persons”:
(1) The Certification must disclose any persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships,
corporations (including parent corporations), or other entities other than the parties
themselves known by the party to have either: (i) a financial interest (of any kind) in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding; or (ii) any other kind of
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
(2) For purposes of this Rule, the terms “proceeding” and “financial interest” shall have the
meaning assigned by 28 U.S.C. 455 (d)(1), (3) and (4), respectively.
(3) If a party has no disclosure to make pursuant to subparagraph (b)(1), that party must
make a certification stating that no such interest is known other than that of the named
parties to the action.205

¶203

¶204

¶205

¶206

These additional disclosure rules of either variety have proven somewhat more effective in
revealing the parties ultimately behind various Non-Practicing Entity patent litigations. For example,
Intellectual Ventures’ involvement in several cases was not initially disclosed under Rule 7.1 but was
later disclosed under the local rule variations, including one case in which a major portion of its
investors were disclosed.206
For example, in Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, et al.207, the Rule 7.1 disclosure by Oasis Research
stated that the company had no parent corporation and that no publicly held corporation owned
10% or more of its stock.208 But seven months later in complying with a local rule similar to one of
the variations above, Oasis Research disclosed that “Intellectual Ventures Computing Platforce
Assets LLC” had a financial interest in the outcome of the case.209 Intellectual Ventures co-founder
Peter Detkin later conceded during a radio interview that Intellectual Ventures Computing Platforce
Assets, LLC was an Intellectual Ventures shell company.210
Similarly, in Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP,211 the plaintiff Xilinx filed a declaratory
judgment action in California against six Intellectual Ventures affiliated companies shortly after
Intellectual Ventures affiliated companies sued three Xilinx competitors in Delaware.212 Xilinx and
Intellectual Ventures had been in licensing discussions prior to the filing of the lawsuit;213 Xilinx is
also apparently an investor in Intellectual Ventures.214
In the California lawsuit, Intellectual Ventures and Xilinx engaged in a battle of motions
concerning whether the disclosure could be filed under seal or for attorneys’ eyes only, rather than
204 C.D. Cal. R. 7.1-1, available at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (click “Local Rules” link, then search for “7.1” and select
“F.R.Civ.P. 7.1 Disclosure Statement”).
205 N.D. Cal. R. 3-16, available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/3/Civ6-11.pdf (referring to definitions from 28
U.S.C. § 455).
206 See Defendants’ Certificate Of Interested Entities Or Persons Pursuant To Civil Local Rule 3-16 and F.R.C.P. 7.1, Xilinx v.
Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
207 Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, No. 4:10-CV-00435-MHS ALM (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2010). The case is still pending.
208 Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement, Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, No. 4:10-CV-00435-MHS-ALM (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010).
209 Plaintiff Oasis Research, LLC’s Disclosure Pursuant To The Court’s Order To Meet, Report And Appear At Scheduling
Conference, Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, No. 4:10-CV-00435-MHS-ALM (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2010).
210 See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5.
211 Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 14, 2011).
212 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp, No. 1:10-CV-01065-LPS (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010).
213 See Intellectual Ventures Motion to Dismiss at 6, 9, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal.
filed Apr. 11, 2011) (Intellectual Ventures describes its negotiations with Xilinx as “routine patent licensing discussions” but
concedes that after two months of negotiations, the parties had not even agreed to a non-disclosure agreement that would “allow
more detailed technical discussions to proceed”).
214 Of the four Intellectual Ventures funds listed in Intellectual Ventures’ disclosure of interested parties, Xilinx is listed as a
potentially interested party in two of the funds. Defendants’ Certificate Of Interested Entities Or Persons Pursuant To Civil Local
Rule 3-16 and F.R.C.P. 7.1, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us

¶207

¶208

¶209

¶210

40

publicly. As the parties’ motions began flying across the judge’s bench, the judge recused herself,
presumably because she became aware of the identities of the interested parties, and a new judge was
appointed.215 The new judge accepted Xilinx’ arguments and the Intellectual Ventures parties
disclosed publicly a list of investors including more than 50 entities, such as the World Bank, the
Mayo Clinic, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and several universities.216
In Xilinx, the court has now dismissed several of the Intellectual Ventures parties on the grounds
that they were not the legal owners for some of the patents specifically mentioned in Xilinx’s
declaratory judgment action.217 The legal owners for these patents include some seven other
Intellectual Ventures shell companies,218 and the California judge has transferred this portion of the
lawsuit to Delaware.219 So, the network of affiliated shell companies seems to have served Intellectual
Ventures well in this case because its network was so vast that Xilinx did not identify the formal
owner among a group of extremely related parties, allowing transfer of portions of the case to
Delaware. The case is a cautionary tale for any company targeted by a mass aggregator that one
should pay careful attention to who actually owns the patents being pushed in a licensing campaign,
as opposed to who is doing the licensing negotiation or who may ultimately receive the funds from
the licensing or litigation. Thus, for example, when a licensing target decides to file a declaratory
judgment action based on a campaign launched by Chilly Willy Licensing, LLC for the benefit of
Chilly Willy Licensing Partners LP, the target should make sure to name Chilly Willy Patent Holding
LLC in the complaint and be grateful that the corporate names include their function in the overall
enterprise—otherwise, Chilly Willy Patent Holding will file its own complaint in the jurisdiction of its
choosing while Chilly Willy Licensing seeks dismissal from the declaratory judgment action on
grounds that it is not the patent owner.
Outside the disclosure requirements designed for judicial recusal, entities have considerable
ability to camouflage their ownership. Most states offer corporate forms that allow companies to
shield the identity of their owners, typically in the context of a limited liability company (“LLC”)
format. In some states, such as Delaware, no public information is provided regarding the owners of
such companies. Other states, such as Nevada, allow limited public disclosure of an LLC’s
management, although the disclosure is also too limited to identify the ultimate owners or the names
of real persons responsible for their day-to-day affairs.
For private actors in patent litigation against mass aggregator shell companies, finding the
identity of the owners or investors is only one hurdle; holding the owners or investors liable for the
activities of the shell corporation is far more difficult. Under most circumstances, a corporation is
regarded as a legal entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers, directors, and investors.
When a corporation is used by another entity to perpetrate fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish
some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, however, a court may pierce the corporate veil and treat
the corporation’s acts as if they were done by those controlling the corporation.220
In battles over piercing the corporate veil, the structures being adopted by some of the mass
aggregators may be helpful in protecting them. A key predicate in piercing the corporate veil
215 Judge Koh recused herself from the case on April 28, 2011. Order of Recusal, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP,
No. 11-CV-00671-LHK (ND Cal. Apr. 28, 2011). Judge Koh became a Superior Court judge in 2008 and a federal judge as
recently as 2010; prior to that she was in private practice. By contrast, Judge Illston, who was assigned to the case after Judge Koh,
has been a federal judge since 1995.
216 Defendants’ Certificate Of Interested Entities Or Persons Pursuant To Civil Local Rule 3-16 and F.R.C.P. 7.1, Xilinx v.
Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
217 See Order Re: Motions To Enjoin, Dismiss And/Or Transfer, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011).
218 Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Xilinx’s Complaint For Declaratory Judgment, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP,
No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (the chart on page 12, lines 6-11 identifies the owners of the patents subject to
declaratory judgment as Intellectual Ventures affiliates Detelle Relay KG, LLC, Roldan Block NY, LLC, Latrosse Technologies,
LLC, TR Technologies Foundation LLC, Taichi Holdings, LLC, Noregin Assets N.V., LLC, and Intellectual Venture Funding
LLC).
219 See supra note 211.
220 See, e.g., Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 980, 993 (1995).
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concerns the presence or absence of distinct legal entities.221 Some mass aggregators, such as
Intellectual Ventures and Transpacific, are structured so that each layer is a distinct legal entity,
providing a measure of protection. Courts are extremely reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in most
circumstances,222 and the carefully crafted legal structures will make it particularly difficult to
disregard the corporate form.
Piercing the corporate veil is less of a direct issue for antitrust actions brought by either private
plaintiffs or competition authorities. Under those circumstances, the mass aggregator and its shell
company or third-party privateer could conceivably be charged with concerted action in violation of
the antitrust laws.223 At the very least, however, such actions would require alteration of the
definition of relevant markets, as well as an enhanced system for monitoring relevant behavior.
C. Removing the Teeth of the Tiger

¶212

¶213

We cannot close the article without highlighting the systemic problems giving rise to the
phenomenon of mass aggregation. One must keep in mind the peculiar elements that have brought
us to the point at which large, respectable companies feel the need to sign onto patent defense funds.
These are the same elements that make mass aggregation activity so potentially troubling.
Troll behavior, whether small or aggregated, is fueled by a patent system that lacks a costeffective method of quickly resolving validity and infringement questions. There are better uses for
federal courts than using them as forums for conducting licensing negotiations. A copious supply of
patents that are only lightly tested at the time of the grant enhances the problem. As long as
insufficient information, uncertainty, and high transaction costs reign, troll activity will continue to
flourish. We should focus our efforts not only on limiting troubling behavior among mass
aggregators but also on making trolling a less lucrative endeavor in the first instance.
CONCLUSION

¶214

¶215

¶216

The patent world is poised to undergo a change of astounding proportions. A system that has
operated such that the vast majority of patents bring little or no return is shifting to a system in
which a substantial number of patents will become traded and monetized, largely through a system of
mass aggregators. The giants among us are undoubtedly changing the patent world. The question that
remains is how.
One could argue that mass aggregators could potentially have positive effects. Mass aggregators
might potentially ensure that the forgotten inventor receives the compensation due or could serve as
a middleman to connect inventors with capital and expertise. Mass aggregators could also serve as
litigation defense funds, providing Just-in-Time patenting and creating a powerful weapon stream
that will deter troublesome infringement suits. Mass aggregators may also reduce troll activity by
soaking up the supply of monetizable patents. The question, however, is whether the cure is worse
than the disease.
In particular, the same market characteristics that have led to the rise of troll activity are likely to
plague the activities of mass aggregators as well. Without changing the basic incentive structures of
the patent system, mass aggregation will be no better than the current patent system at rewarding the
deserving inventor and greasing the wheels of innovation while protecting diligent producing
companies. Moreover, the activity of mass aggregation brings its own potential harms. Rather than
contributing technological innovations, mass aggregators operate as a tax on current production,
burdening existing products and potentially reducing future innovation and productivity. In addition,
See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 470-71 (2000).
See, e.g., Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Ct., 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 539 (2000) (noting that alter ego [piercing the
corporate veil] is an extreme remedy, sparingly used); accord Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003).
223 One might also try to establish that third-party privateers were acting as agents on behalf of the mass aggregator. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1 (2006) (focusing on whether the purported agent acts on the principal's behalf and
subject to the principal's control).
221
222
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characteristics of the market for patent monetization make it an excellent vehicle for anticompetitive
behavior, including horizontal collusion and single firm or multi-firm behavior that raises rivals’
costs. Most important, the basic business model of mass aggregation is troubling. The successful
aggregator is likely to be the one that frightens the greatest number of companies in the most
terrifying way. This may not be an activity that society wants to encourage.
These and other concerns suggest that mass aggregators and the market for patent monetization
should not be allowed to flourish unchecked. The burgeoning market must be properly monitored,
regulated, and restricted so that the considerable risks associated with this activity may be fully
contemplated and cabined.
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Alabama, University of
Brigham Young University
Bristol, University of
British Columbia, University of
Brunel University
California Institute of Technology
California, the Regents of the University of
Campinas State University (Brazil)
City University London
Clemson University
Connecticut, University of
Darmstadt, Technical University of
Duke University
Florida Institute Of Technology
Florida, University of
Helsinki University of Technology
Hiroshima University
Hong Kong University
Indian Institute of Technology - Bombay
Kyushu University
Manitoba, University of
McMaster University
Monash University
New Jersey Institute of Technology
New Mexico, University of
New South Wales, University of
North Carolina at Charlotte, University of
Oklahoma, University of
Ottawa, University of
Oulu, University of
Polytechnic University
Ramot at Tel Aviv University
Rhode Island University
Rochester Institute Of Technology
Rochester, University of
Rutgers University
Singapore, National University of
Southern Mississippi, University of
Stevens Institute Of Technology
Stirling, University Of
Strathclyde, University of
Texas, University System, the Board Of Regents
University of California San Diego
Western Sydney, University of
Westminster, University of
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APPENDIX B
Investors in Various Intellectual Ventures Funds as Reported by Intellectual Ventures
in Xilinx v. Intellectual Ventures Investment Fund I, L.P. et al. on May 16, 2011
No.

1.
2.

Investor

4.
5.

Cisco Systems, Inc.

6.

eBay Inc.

7.

Google Inc.

8.

Intel Corporation

9.

Microsoft Corporation

10.

Nokia Corporation

11.
12.

Nvidia International Holdings,
Inc., an affiliate of Nvidia
Corporation
SAP America, Inc.

13.

Sony Corporation

14.
15.

Verizon Corporate Services
Group Inc.
Xilinx, Inc.

16.

Yahoo! Inc.

17.

INVESTMENT FUND
Allen SBH Investments LLC

18.

Charles River Ventures

19.

Commonfund Capital Venture
Partners VII, L.P.
Flag Capital

20.

Invention
Investment
Fund II

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

OPERATING COMPANY
Adobe Systems Incorporated
Amazon.com NV Investment
Holdings Inc., an affiliate of
Amazon.com, Inc.
American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc.
Apple, Inc.

3.

Invention
Investment
Fund I

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Intellectual
Ventures I

Intellectual
Ventures II

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Notes

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Entity related to the
Allen & Company
LLC
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
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Verne Sedlacek is
president & CEO
Diana H. Frazier
and Peter Lawrence
co-founded Flag
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21.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as
trustee for White Plaza Group
Trust

22.

Certain funds of McKinsey and
Company, Inc.
Next Generation Partners V,
L.P.

23.
24.

Sequoia Holdings, LLC

25.

Sohn Partners

Financial
Interest

45
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

FOUNDATION/UNIVERSITIES/NON-PROFITS
Board of Regents of The
University of Texas System
27. The Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior
University
28. Brown University
26.

It is not clear who
are the beneficiaries
of the White Plaza
Group Trust.
Appears to be
related to Flag
Capital
Sequoia was
founded by David
Beisner

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

29.

Bush Foundation

30.

Cornell University

31.

Dore Capital, L.P., and affiliate
of The Vanderbilt University

32.

The Flora Family Foundation

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

33.

Grinnell College

34.
35.

Howard Hughes Medical
Institute
International Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development, as trustee

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

36.

Legacy Ventures

37.
38.

Mayo Clinic and Mayo
Foundation Master Retirement
Trust
Northwestern University

39.

Reading Hospital

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

The Archibald Bush
Foundation was
established by a
former 3M
chairman.

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
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Dore appears to
have a relationship
with Apax Europe
VI-A, L.P.
Founded by William
Hewlett and Flora
Hewlett.

The IBRD is one of
five banks that
comprise the World
Bank
Russ Hall, Alan
Marty, and Chris
Eyre are the
managing directors

A non-profit
hospital located in
Reading, Penn.
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40.

The Rockefeller Foundation

41.

Skillman Foundation

42.

TIFF Private Equity Partners

43.

Trustees of the University of
Pennsylvania
University of Southern
California
University of Minnesota

44.
45.
46.

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

The William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation

INDIVIDUALS
47. Dobkin, Eric

46

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

48.

Fields, Richard

Financial
Interest

49.

Gould, Paul

Financial
Interest

50.

Holiber, Adam

51.

Peretsman, Nancy

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest

A Detroit-based
charity that includes
a member of the
Ford family in its
board of directors.
TIFF: “The
Investment Fund of
Foundations,” is an
investment
cooperative.

Financial
Interest
Financial
Interest

Financial
Interest
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Appears to be Eric
Dobkin, an advisory
director to
Goldman Sachs and
Chairman Emeritus
of Global Equity
Capital Markets
This may be
Richard Fields,
Chairman of
Coastal
Development, LLC
This may be Paul
Gould, a director of
Allen & Co.
The may be Adam
Holiber, president
of Summit Equity
This would appear
to be Nancy
Peretsman, a
director of
priceline.com and
managing director
at Allen &
Company LLC
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APPENDIX C
A. Introduction
¶1

¶2

¶3

¶4

¶5

This appendix summarizes the methodology employed in uncovering Intellectual Ventures
patent holdings.1 Our methodology relies on two broad categories of similarities among the 1,276
Intellectual Ventures shells that we have identified. We will term the first category “corporate
similarities” and the second category “patent prosecution similarities.” These two sets of similarities
are reasonably independent of each other and thus provide some confidence that a suspected shell
company has a relationship with Intellectual Ventures.
We first reviewed the open literature about Intellectual Ventures. Many of these articles
identified a few of Intellectual Ventures’ shell companies.2 Other articles identified companies that
had purportedly sold or licensed patents to Intellectual Ventures. We next reviewed corporate
records for those publicly identified Intellectual Ventures shell companies. After observing
similarities in the structure of these shell companies, we expanded our investigation to look for other
companies sharing the same characteristics.
Using this initial list of shell companies, we searched the US Patent & Trademark Office’s
assignment database to find which companies were listed as the assignees or licensees of patents
and/or published applications. Where possible, we attempted to find public information about the
transactions involved. We performed this process iteratively several times in order to expand the list
of shell companies. Thus, the first phase of our research comprised looking for “corporate
similarities” among suspected shell companies.
The second phase of our research concerned reviewing “patent prosecution similarities.” In this
phase, we reviewed the patent portfolios of the shell companies to look for active cases—pending
applications, continuations, and reissue applications—under the assumption that the new owner
would have likely filed a new power of attorney in order to take over prosecution of the case from
the previous owner.3 We also reviewed assignment data for the patents where available. We
assumed that the information gleaned from these information sources would provide independent
support for the “corporate similarities” uncovered in the first phase and in many cases actually
include the name of an Intellectual Ventures executive, employee, or agent. We then integrated the
results of our findings, conducting further research into Intellectual Ventures’ corporate organization
and its apparent business plans.
Finally, we prepared integrated lists of the patents and published applications for the shell
companies that we found.4 This phase also included determining the first International Patent
Classification (IPC) class for the patents and applications since the Intellectual Ventures portfolio
need not necessarily have a single specific technology focus. If this portfolio contained fewer than
100 patents, then it might be sufficient to simply list the patents by number and title. However, with
11,000+ patents and pending applications spread across a variety of technologies, understanding this
portfolio suggests that the patents also be organized by technical subject matter.

1 The methodology discussed here describes techniques that enabled author Tom Ewing to create an initial survey of
Intellectual Ventures’ holdings in 2007. The data have been expanded and updated with the most recent version in May 2011. On
the model of Lex Machina, which was originally a project of Stanford Law School, the database is available for a cost to
commercial entities from author Tom Ewing. Certain use of the database is available on different terms to academics.
2 See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, IV Moves From Myth To Reality, 32 Intellectual Asset Management August/September 2006
(the article identifies 48 Intellectual Ventures shell companies).
3 See, e.g., 37 CFR 1.32 Power of Attorney, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_rules.pdf and Manual of Patent Examining Procedure Sec. 402;
available online at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/0400_402.htm#sect402.
4 We provide detailed listings of patents in our full Intellectual Ventures report.

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us
¶6

48

The documents found during this investigation provide a rich source of information that further
link the apparent shell companies to Intellectual Ventures and suggest avenues for future research.
After providing an overview of our methodology, we will discuss how our methodology was
employed to discover two specific Intellectual Ventures shell companies. These shell companies are
Ben Franklin Patent Holding, LLC and Northstar Acquisitions, LLC. Ben Franklin Patent Holding,
LLC is a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures shell company that has been mentioned in several
articles about Intellectual Ventures.5 Ben Franklin is also a fairly easy shell company to trace to
Intellectual Ventures because its portfolio came from another Intellectual Ventures shell named
Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding I, LLC in a transaction conducted on Nov. 18, 2003.6
Northstar Acquisitions, LLC is another company that we suspected was an Intellectual Ventures shell
based, among other things, on certain similarities that Northstar shares with Ben Franklin. We
eventually found documents signed by an Intellectual Venture employee/agent who had also signed
documents for Ben Franklin. To our knowledge, Northstar had not been identified as an Intellectual
Ventures shell company prior to our original 2007 report.
B. Corporate Similarities

¶7

¶8

We first studied Intellectual Ventures’ apparent corporate structure, focusing primarily on the
shell companies. We next studied the available corporate information about these publicly identified
shell companies in order to find characteristics or features that might reveal other shell companies.
We noticed that all of the publicly identified shell companies were of the “limited liability company,”
or “LLC” form. We further noticed that the publicly identified shell companies were generally
registered in either Delaware or Nevada.
We also noted that the sole addresses for the Delaware companies were:
•
•
•

¶9

¶10

2711 Centerville Road Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808,
1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, or
160 Greentree Drive Suite 101, Dover, DE 19904

These addresses correspond to addresses for the three largest registered agency firms in the US. The
Centerville Road address is the address for the Corporation Service Company (CSC). The Orange
Street address is the address for the Corporation Trust Company (CTC), and the Greentree Drive
address is the address for National Registered Agents, Inc. (NRA).7
Similarly, the Nevada registered companies have addresses that correspond to the Nevada
address for these same registered agency firms. For example, many companies have the CSC’s
Centerville Road address listed for Delaware and CSC’s 2215-B Renaissance Drive, Suite 5, Las
Vegas, NV 89119 address as their registered Nevada address.8
The organization of the Nevada registered companies allowed us to find additional shell
companies. For example, the listed manager in Nevada for the three publicly identified Intellectual
Ventures shells Poulsen Transmitter LLC, Smeaton Pump LLC, and Twain Typesetting LLC is
“Gigaloo LLC.”9 We were curious to see if Gigaloo LLC was the manager for any other companies
Sind-Flor, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Reel/Frame: 014770/0486, US Patent Office Assignment Database for US Patent No. 5675811, recording the
change of name from Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding I, L.L.C. to Ben Franklin Patent Holding LLC, available at
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=014770&frame=0486 (last visited Nov. 30, 2011.).
7 See, Delaware Authorized Searchers, Delaware Secretary of State, which lists all three companies at these addresses; available
at http://corp.delaware.gov/uccauthsrch.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
8 See, e.g., LVL Patent Group, LLC v. DirectTV, Inc., Echostar Technologies, L.L.C; Echostar
Corporation and Dish Network L.L.C., 1:99-mc-09999 (D. Del. 2011) (“EchoStar Corp. has appointed CSC Services of
Nevada, Inc., 2215-B Renaissance Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89118, as its agent for service of process.”), available at:
http://morrisjames.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/lvl-patent-group-llc-v-directv-inc-et-al.pdf.
9 On the Nevada Secretary of State business entity website, select “officer” and enter “Gigaloo” in the “last name” field. The
search will produce these 10 companies managed by Gigaloo, LLC. We first performed this search on May 30, 2007 and most
recently performed it on Nov. 30, 2011; website available at http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/corpsearch.aspx.
5
6
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in Nevada. Our inquiry revealed that seven other companies—Ayscough Visuals LLC, Fahrenheit
Thermoscope LLC, Hollerith Statistics LLC, Maiman Laser Systems LLC, McGill Fastenings LLC,
Newcomen Engine LLC, and Ochoa Optics LLC—were also managed by Gigaloo. We observed
that these seven companies also shared the characteristics that drew us to the first three shell
companies.
As a backup test, we spot checked the USPTO assignment database and discovered that all 10
Gigaloo-managed companies, except for McGill Fastenings, were assigned patents in transactions
recorded from 2004-200710. As a further test, we spot-checked this list to see if any of these
companies seemed to have a presence on the web that indicated actual commercial activity. For
example, could we find any mention of Hollerith Statistics LLC as a going entity with an actual office
and an actual staff? For the companies that we spot-checked, we found nothing.
This process led us to notice additional commonalities among these companies. For example,
we noticed that many of Intellectual Ventures’ early shell companies have two-part names that are
either derived from the work of a famous artist or scientist (e.g., Steinbeck Cannery LLC), or contain
a color (e.g., Purple Mountain Server), or a geographical location (e.g., Baldwyn Brices Cross Roads11).
We later observed that some of the shells seemed to have been named after minerals and other
chemical compositions.
We further observed that many of the shell companies were also created in both Delaware and
Nevada on similar, if not the same, dates. For example, of the 51 management companies, 34 were
incorporated in Delaware on Sept. 7, 2004, and all the companies managed by Algorythm LLC were
created on March 17, 2005.12 We also noticed that some shell companies seemed to have been
formed in Nevada only and have no Delaware counterpart. We have similarly observed that other
shell companies have been formed in Delaware only with no Nevada counterpart.
Our list of corporate characteristics for the Nevada companies eventually included: 1) LLC
corporate form, 2) a Nevada corporation, or a Delaware corporation also registered in Nevada, 3)
identical addresses for registered agents in Delaware and Nevada, 4) similar dates of corporate
formation, 5) recipient of patents assigned/licensed between 2000-2007, 6) no corporate existence
prior to Intellectual Ventures’ formation in 2000, 7) no recorded patents prior to Intellectual
Ventures’ formation in 2000, 8) management by a company having a one-word name that also has
the LLC corporate form, and 9) approximately 10 companies under management by the LLC
management company where none of the 10 companies seemed to have an independent commercial
existence.
C. Patent Prosecution Similarities

¶15

A patent prosecution file history may provide information about who owns a patent and/or the
company ostensibly prosecuting the patent. When a patent or pending application is purchased, the
new owner will not only want to register his ownership of the patent with the USPTO, he will also
want to assume control over the prosecution of any pending patent applications.13 In order to
assume control, the patent owner must file a new power of attorney with the USPTO and must also
10 We conducted this research in preparation for the first edition of our report in 2007. Searches for later editions did not
terminate in 2007. We note that McGill Fastenings had no patents recorded against its name in 2007 and in 2011 still has no
patents recorded against its name, according to the USPTO assignment database. This does not mean that the company holds no
patent rights.
11 We noticed that the names of some Intellectual Ventures shells, such as Baldwyn Brices Cross Roads, curiously seemed to
be found in a sample template available with the Shoebox program for organizing photographs by their content. This may be mere
coincidence or it might possibly provide some support for the rumor that the names of Intellectual Ventures shells are selected by
a computer. One Shoebox template can be found at:
http://www.kavasoft.com/Shoebox/categories/examples/Things/National_Parks.html.
12 Algorythm LLC manages Reverb Communications LLC, Teledata Sound LLC, Home Systems LLC, Portable Management
LLC, Null Networks LLC, Meyer Cordless LLC, Mobile Lines LLC, Discobolus Management LLC, Logic Data Funds LLC, And
Redirection LLC. This search can be replicated by entering “Algorithm” in the “first name” field and “LLC” in the last name field
for “officer” on the Nevada Secretary of State’s website. If one then checks the history for each of the companies, one sees that
they were all registered in Nevada on March 17, 2005.
13 Supra note 3.

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us

¶16

¶17

¶18

50

typically file a statement that shows a chain of title. These documents are typically signed by a person
working for, or authorized by the new owner.14 Thus, these documents provide an opportunity to
find the name of a person associated with the patent-owning company.
For example, Creative Mines LLC is a company that had not been identified as an Intellectual
Ventures shell prior to our 2007 report. Using the corporate similarities methodology discussed
above, we found Creative Mines by first finding Searete LLC, which is a publicly identified
Intellectual Ventures shell company. We next located the manager for Searete in Nevada, which is
Nevada Licensing Manager LLC.15 We next searched for other companies managed by Nevada
Licensing Manager, which led us to, led us to consider Creative Mines. When we searched for
agreements involving Creative Mines, we found the following agreement16 which not only identifies
Creative Mines but also ties the company to Intellectual Ventures:

The 1756—114th Ave. SE, Ste. 110, Bellevue, Washington address has been Intellectual
Ventures’ address.17 This address may be found in numerous Intellectual Ventures documents,
including the self-reported employer address of Intellectual Ventures provided by co-founder Greg
Gorder on the Washington State Bar Association website, which is provided below. Thus, a
company found only by the methodology laid out above was shown to be linked to Intellectual
Ventures by reviewing the patent file history for a patent owned by the shell company.
The power of attorney document for the Creative Mines patent applications was signed by Greg
Gorder who also placed his personal assistant’s phone number at Intellectual Ventures on the power
of attorney document.18 This phone number has Intellectual Ventures’ main exchange but is slightly
different from the number that Gorder provided to the Washington State Bar Association.19

Id.
See notes 196-199 in the main article.
16 The agreement may be found on the USPTO’s PAIR database under patent application 09/821,694 (now US Patent
6,949,340; select the “Image File Wrapper” tab and then select the PDF for the document “Oath or Declaration” filed on June 28,
2005. The selection above is found on page 2. The PAIR website may be accessed at
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
17 See, e.g., Matt Rainey, “Comments on NPRM re Reexam rules,” USPTO website, available at:
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab77/iv.pdf.
18 Supra note 16 at 1.
19 See, Greg Gorder entry on the Washington State Bar Association webpage; search originally conducted June 14, 2007;
search repeated Nov. 30, 2011 with same results but for updated address for Intellectual Ventures; WSBA lawyer directory
available at: http://www.mywsba.org/default.aspx?tabid=178&RedirectTabId=177&Usr_ID=15288.
14
15
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Gorder also signed the power of attorney document for the Point Reyes National Liquidator
LLC.20 On this document, he used Intellectual Ventures’ main phone number.

D. Two Shell Companies—Ben Franklin and Northstar Acquisitions
¶20

Both Ben Franklin and Northstar Acquisitions are Delaware corporations.21 Both companies
were registered as foreign corporations in Nevada on Oct. 1, 2004.22 The registered address for both
companies in Delaware is 2711 Centerville Road Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808. The registered
address for both companies in Nevada is 2215-B Renaissance Drive, Suite 5, Las Vegas, NV 89119.
20 Power of Attorney for US Patent Application 10/364,979, filed Feb. 23, 2004, and signed by Greg Gorder; document
available via USPTO PAIR database at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
21 Ben Franklin was formed in Delaware on April 22, 2003 and Northstar Acquisition was formed on March 27, 2003,
according to the Delaware Secretary of State; available at https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/GINameSearch.jsp, enter “Ben
Franklin Patent Holding” for the first search and “Northstar Acquisition” for the second search.
22 See, the Nevada Secretary of State’s business entity website, available at https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/controller, for
the first search, enter “Ben Franklin Patent Holding” in the “entity name” field and for the second search, enter “Northstar
Acquisitions” in the “entity name” field.
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Both companies have also used addresses in Los Altos, California, including the same address in Los
Altos, which Intellectual Ventures co-founder Peter Detkin gave to the California Bar Association,
the New York Bar Association, and the US Patent & Trademark Office.23
Ben Franklin and Northstar share similarities in patent prosecution. Documents filed in at least
one pending application owned by Ben Franklin identify Peter Detkin, an Intellectual Ventures cofounder, as the managing director of Ben Franklin. Other documents filed with the US Patent &
Trademark Office for Ben Franklin have been signed by attorney Julia Ceffalo. Washington State
Bar Association records indicate that Ms. Ceffalo is an attorney working for the Invention Law
Group, PLLC, which seems to be an Intellectual Ventures-created law firm.24 As shown below, we
have found powers of attorney signed by Ms. Ceffalo for both Ben Franklin and Northstar
Acquisitions, linking Northstar Acquisition to Ben Franklin and thus to Intellectual Ventures itself. 25
We have repeated this process with thousands of suspected Intellectual Ventures shell companies.
Ben Franklin obtained a portfolio of 24 patents and 12 published applications from Intellectual
Ventures Patent Holding I, LLC in a transaction which recognized that Intellectual Ventures Patent
Holding I’s name had been changed to Ben Franklin. Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding I
obtained these patents from General Magic, Inc., a company that developed a pioneering PDA-like
device in the early 1990s but closed its doors in 2002.26 Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding
executed its agreement with General Magic, which was in voluntary bankruptcy, on April 22, 2003.27
This agreement was recorded in the US Patent and Trademark Office on July 25, 2003.28
The documents filed with the USPTO on Ben Franklin’s behalf bear the signatures of
Intellectual Ventures co-founders Peter Detkin and Greg Gorder. The documents also link
Intellectual Ventures with a Los Altos address that is also found in at least 70 other patent files
associated with some of the early Intellectual Ventures shell companies.
As shown below, Gorder signed the original agreement with General Magic to obtain the patents
that eventually became Ben Franklin’s portfolio29:

23 We learned from Peter Detkin shortly after publication of our first edition that this address was his residential address, and
while this address has been available on three public websites, we subsequently removed the address at Mr. Detkin’s request.
24 However, Intellectual Ventures’ own automated telephone directory has indicated that Ms. Ceffalo is an Intellectual
Ventures employee, based on a call placed to Intellectual Ventures on June 15, 2007.
25 We have found Ms. Ceffalo’s name on power of attorney documents filed with the USPTO for 139 different Intellectual
Ventures shell companies.
26 See, e.g., Wikipedia, “General Magic,” available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Magic.
27 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/712,712, now US Patent No. 6,839,733, “Power of Attorney” filed on April
28, 2004, pages 7-12 which provide the “Asset Purchase Agreement” (see “recitals”), file history available at
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
28 USPTO Assignment Database, Reel/frame “014313/0813”, available at
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=014313&frame=0813.
29 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/712,712, now US Patent No. 6,839,733, “Power of Attorney” filed on April
28, 2004, page 8, file history available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
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Even though one can find an assignment of the patents from Intellectual Ventures Patent
Holding I to Ben Franklin in the USPTO’s assignment database, the two companies are actually the
same company30. In Nov. 2003, Gorder filed this amendment with the Delaware Division of
Corporations changing the Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding’s name to Ben Franklin:31

The USPTO database describes the transaction as a “change of name.”
See, file history for US Patent Application 09/934,121, “Oath or Declaration” filed on May 20, 2004, page 8, file history
available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair. (This document also exposes a management shell company called
Acquisition Management LLC since Gorder signed as an officer of this company.)
30
31
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Interestingly, both Gorder and Detkin have served as “managing directors” of Ben Franklin in a
two-month time period, according to power of attorney documents filed in Intellectual Ventures
cases. The oldest document shows Detkin32 as managing director and the newer document shows
Gorder as managing director33:

32 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/712,712, now US Patent No. 6,839,733, “Power of Attorney” filed on April
28, 2004, page 2, file history available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
33 Supra note 29 at “Power of Attorney” filed on May 20, 2004.
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More importantly, an even-later-filed power of attorney document by Intellectual Ventures’
attorney Julia Ceffalo associates the 171 Main Street, Los Altos address with Ben Franklin, and thus
with Intellectual Ventures itself. As noted above, this address is found in at least 70 other USPTO
case files for the shell companies discussed in this report.34

34 See, patent file history for US Application 11/314,002, now US Patent 7,266,499, power of attorney filed on Feb. 16, 2006,
available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair in the “image file wrapper” tab under “power of attorney” for “02-162006.”
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The earliest Intellectual Ventures transaction that we have found occurred on Feb. 18, 2001
between Purple Techno Solutions LLC and Venturemakers LLC of Campbell, Calif.35 Interestingly,
Purple Techno Solutions did not become incorporated until Dec. 9, 2003.36 The Venturemakers’
transaction was not recorded with the USPTO until August 18, 2005, well after Purple Techno
Solutions had been formed as a company. A power of attorney for Purple Techno Solutions from
2005 is provided below, which also links this company to the Los Altos address.

35 See, USPTO Assignment Database for US Patent “6285986”, available at
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&pat=6285986.
36 See, Delaware Secretary of State business entity search available at https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/GINameSearch.jsp.
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As noted above, Julia Ceffalo37 has also signed at least 139 power of attorney documents in
Intellectual Ventures-related cases, including the authorization for Northstar Acquisition’s pending
patent applications.38 To our knowledge, Northstar Acquisitions had not been previously identified
as an Intellectual Ventures shell prior to the first edition of our report. Ben Franklin and Northstar
Acquisitions are Delaware corporations and both companies have the same registered addresses in
Delaware and Nevada. Interestingly, both companies have also used addresses in Los Altos,
California -- including the address in Los Altos, which Intellectual Ventures co-founder Peter Detkin
gave to the California Bar Association, the New York Bar Association, and the US Patent &
Trademark Office.39
37 Washington State Bar Association records for Julia Ceffalo first accessed on June 3, 2007 and most recently accessed on
Nov. 30, 2007, record available at http://www.mywsba.org/default.aspx?tabid=178&RedirectTabId=177&Usr_ID=30460.
38 See, prosecution file history for US Application 09/750,592, now US Patent 7,433,683, power of attorney filed on Sept. 7,
2004, available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair under “Image File Wrapper.
39 See, Northstar assignment records at reel/frame 018222/0226, available at the USPTO assignment database at
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=018222&frame=0226, and see California Bar Association record for

Copyright © 2011 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing: The Giants Among Us

¶30

60

Northstar Acquisitions obtained a portfolio of 17 patents and 3 published applications from
Pentech Financial Services, Inc. on July 22, 2003, the agreement for which was recorded on Sept. 12,
2003.40 Pentech obtained the patents from Mobility Network Systems, Inc. The portfolio appears to
largely comprise the former assets of mDiversity, Inc., although some of the patents originated with
SC-Wireless, Inc., SC-Wireless, Ltd., and Cellular Telecom, Ltd., and Hitachi Metals, Ltd.

Peter Detkin, available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/134799, originally accessed on June 3, 2007 and
most recently accessed on Nov. 30, 2007, records are the same albeit a slight change in telephone number. As noted, we learned
from Peter Detkin shortly after publication of our first edition that this address was his residential address, and while this address is
available on three public websites, we have obscured the address at Mr. Detkin’s request.
40 See, USPTO Assignment Records for US Patent “5751516,” available at
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&pat=5751516.
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